On 9/30/12 6:13 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 30.9.2012, at 15.41, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 09/30/2012 12:51 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
i still think that a cycle with a Smith set bigger than
3 is soooo unlikely since i still believe that cycles themselves will be
rare in practice.
...
Currently, single-winner elections very rarely have cycles and large
Smith sets are even more rare.
In typical political environments where people know the candidates or
at least the parties well, and where there often are also strong
established orders like teh left-right axis, cycles are indeed quite
rare, and cycles bigger than 3 are even more rare.
...
But in typical political elections top cycles of 4 should be very rare.
and my understanding is that Schulze, RP, and Minmax all elect the same
candidate for case of a simple 3-choice cycle and, of course, they all
elect the same candidate when there is no cycle. so, then wouldn't
simplicity of description be the only salient difference, at least from
a POV of the public?
As far as intrinsically Condorcet methods go, Ranked Pairs feels
simple to me. The only tricky part is the indirect nature of the
"unless it contradicts what you already affirmed" step.
yeah, it's not immediately obvious to me how i would code up Ranked Pairs.
--
r b-j [email protected]
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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