No, only one election, please, no meta-elections. Two elections would take too much time. Thanks for your understanding.
PZ 2013/2/6 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[email protected]>: > On 02/06/2013 08:56 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: >> >> >> >> 2013/2/6 Peter Zbornik <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> >> Jameson, >> >> I am not sure if we understand each other here. >> I am looking for an election system, where the quoted-in seat gives >> (or moves toward) a proportional distribution of the quoted-in gender. >> If we fix the seats which will be quoted-in at no. 2 and 5, the >> quoted-in gender will in some cases not be proportionally distributed, >> for instance when the same group of voters get both quoted-in >> candidates at places 2 and 5. >> >> >> OK. I was responding to your initial statement of the problem, without >> this additional proportionally-quoting-in constraint. >> >> The issue with this constraint is that it is only meaningful if the >> electorate is meaningfully separable into parties. If, on the other >> hand, the electorate is in a 2D issue space, it's hard to see exactly >> what this constraint even means. Thus I suspect no non-partisan system >> can be made to fit this constraint. I could easily see how to meet this >> constraint with a party list system (preferably open, because closed >> list systems are bad), and possibly I could work it out with a >> pseudo-list system like PAL, but with STV it looks to me like an >> impossible task. > > > With a council size of 5, it might be possible to do an election between all > consistent sets. The general idea would be something to the effect of that > you first use a proportional ordering, setting constraints at different > places (force woman at position one, position two, etc). Then you find all > the sets the proportional ordering produces, and you hold a supermajority > election to decide which to use. > > The supermajority election could be a parliamentary procedures one if the > number of members is small, otherwise it would have to be by means of an > election method (or Asset/liquid democracy). I say it'd have to be > supermajority so that the majority can't force disproportionality on the > minority. However, a consensus election might on the other hand give undue > power to the minority. So that leads to another problem, which is similar to > the question of how to get a proportionally represented council if the only > thing you can do is ask the voters to rank the different councils. > > Simmons had some ideas relating to lotteries in that respect, if I'm not > mistaken. I don't remember the details, though. Could they be applied here? > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
