On 02/12/2013 01:42 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
On 2/11/2013 2:33 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Although what I'm going to say may be a bit offtopic, I think I should
say it. I think it could be useful to quantify exactly what is meant by
quoted-in proportionality in the sense that the Czech Green Party
desires it. Then one may make a "quota proportionality criterion" and
design methods from the ground up that pass it.
In my opinion, your comment is not off-topic.
Yes, I agree that it would be nice to more clearly define the goal.
Yet I've learned that reconsidering goals is a never-ending process
because, when a clearly defined goal is achieved, often it turns out
that a better goal becomes evident. (Especially if the intent behind the
original goal was not achieved, in spite of having achieved the clearly
stated goal.)
In this case I presume the gender-based quota requirement is a temporary
goal.
Hopefully, as more women get elected (because of using better ballots
and better counting methods), the need for it will disappear.
If it's easy to define the quota-based goal, such a definition would be
useful.
But, in my opinion, spending time developing an election method that
optimizes the clearly stated goal is not likely to provide a useful
return on investment (ROI) -- because it must be discarded when the
quota is no longer needed.
Indeed, that is a point. A more general criterion might be of more use.
It could be something like: the method is preset with a number of sets
and restrictions on which set can come in which place. Then the method
must ensure this invariant is not broken while otherwise being
proportional (in some manner).
When gender-based quotas are desired, the sets are just the set of all
men and the set of all women, and the restrictions are on which gender
can come in which place.
Another criterion could simply say: the proportion of set X in the
council must be equal to some proportion set as input, +/- some error
also given as input, unless there are no sets that satisfy this. Again,
with gender quotas, one can set "must have 50% women +/- 10%", for instance.
In both cases, the method reduces to plain old PR if one doesn't make
use of the quota. One can easily not provide any constraints in the
first criterion's case, and say "must have 50% women, +/- 50%" in the
latter.
If nothing else, the method should be usable as a method without quotas,
just like, say, Schulze STV is usable as a single-winner method. Then
one may or may not use the additional quota functionality. In an
organization, whether or not to have quotas (and how strict, and
similar) could be decided by consensus, thus protecting the minority
from being overruled by the majority.
I think it makes more sense to use an election method that provides fair
results in many/most situations, and do some adjustments to accommodate
a temporary situation (such as gender bias), and then abandon those
adjustments when the results match the ultimate goal.
Presumably the ultimate goal is "gender equality" -- which itself is
probably worth defining clearly (although not here!).
Yes. I think the quoting-in should be an additional feature that could
be turned on or off. If one doesn't trust the organization (or
government, or whoever is using the method) not to turn it off, one
could just mandate in the bylaws that the setting be on, and that some
supermajority is required to turn it off.
In a way, that would be the case even if the method had the
quota-setting forced to on. Say we have a gender-equalized version of
Schulze STV (call it SSTVG). Then consider a meta-method that uses SSTVG
if one has agreed a quota is to be used, otherwise uses ordinary Schulze
STV. That metamethod is now an adjustable gender-equalized method.
Similarly, there's nothing to prevent a majority or supermajority
(depending on the regulations) from replacing a gender-equalized version
of some method with the same method lacking that feature, given power to
alter the rules.
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