On 12.2.2013, at 0.33, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:

> I think it could be useful to quantify exactly what is meant by quoted-in 
> proportionality in the sense that the Czech Green Party desires it. Then one 
> may make a "quota proportionality criterion" and design methods from the 
> ground up that pass it.

My best understanding of the quoted-in related requirements is now as follows. 
The key idea is that if a seat is about to go to a candidate that is of wrong 
gender, then the fact that this seat must be given to some "less liked" 
candidate makes the seat in some sense less valuable to the grouping that 
supports these candidates. The rule is not exactly about one of the sexes since 
one (quoted-in) seat may be forced to go to a male candidate and another seat 
(of the same grouping) to a female candiate. The rule is not really about 
avoinding allocating more than one quoted-in seat to one grouping since 
sometimes the value of two (less valuable) quoted-in seats is the ideal way to 
balance the seats between the groupings (best proportionality). To my 
understanding there is also no requirement to have equal number of male and 
female representatives in each grouping (only a requirement to do so at top 
level, i.e. to make the proportinally ordered list balanced with respect to 
gender
 s).

Since there is also a general proportionality requirement in the traditional 
sense (each grouping to get a proportional number of representatives), there 
are two conflicting requirements, and therefore also a need to agree the 
correct balance between these two requirements (traditional proportionality and 
need to balance the allocated less valuable (quoted-in) seats). I mean that if 
the elected quoted-in candidate is 10 points worse than the candidate that 
would have been elected without the quoted-in rule, then that can be 
compensated by giving that grouping some fraction of a seat more seats (worth 
10 points). All groupings will thus not get all those representatives that they 
wanted (quoted-in rule), and they will also not get the proportionally correct 
number of representatives. There is thus a need to agree what the value of one 
seat is, and what the negative value of getting a quoted-in seat is. These 
weights must be determined by a political agreement.

Once the weights of these benefits have been determined, it should be a more 
exact task to determine what algorithm finds the best allocation of the seats. 
It is however quite difficult to estimate if some candidate that was elected as 
a quoted-in candidate would or would not have been elected also otherwise. And 
if not elected without the quoted-in rule, how much the opinions were violated 
in this particular change of representative. Some agreement is needed also here 
on how to measure these values. One may also follow some theoretical model that 
gives "exact" values to the quoted-in representatives (based on the preferences 
on the ballots). Or maybe there is just one constatnt value for all quoted-in 
seats.

What would the "quota proportionality criterion" be then? Based on this 
discussion one should first make some agreements on what the weights of 
different (conflicting) needs are. Once this has been agreed, and assuming that 
we have also a rule for determining the "lost value" of each quoted-in 
candidate, then the algorithm just needs to find the ideal allocation of the 
weighted seats (different representative sets may have different weights). And 
the criterion is just a mathematical proportionality criterion, based on the 
agreed (and/or calculated) weights. Is this close to what you want the 
criterion to be?

Juho


P.S. Personally I think this algorithm gets already quite complex, and there 
are also some arguments why there would be no need or why it would be harmful 
to compensate the quoted-in seats. So also a simpler proportional approach 
could do. But if the Czech Green Party says that the quoted-in seats shall be 
compensated, then let's try to find a good algorithm that will do the job (and 
the correct criterion).





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