2013/6/17 Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[email protected]> > At 01:23 PM 6/17/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote: > > 2013/6/17 Benjamin Grant > <<mailto:[email protected]>benn@**4efix.com<[email protected]> >> > >> >> >> Is *this* an example of Bucklin failing Participation? >> >> 5: A>B>C >> >> 4: B>C>A >> >> A wins >> >> Right >> >> But add these in: >> >> 2: C>A>B >> >> B wins. >> >> >> Yes, with your "tiebreaker". >> > > This is not participation failure. Adding ballots ranking C highest did > not cause C to lose. >
Abd, you're wrong. Adding B>A ballots caused A to lose; that is a participation failure. > > By the way, an oddity about this example. Bucklin is ranked approval. Did > all the voters approve all candidates? > You would prefer it if he had left the third candidate off for each voter group. A less obtuse way to say that would be to say "I would have written this scenario as ... because ...". > > Round 1. Majority is 5 > > A wins in round 1. > > Adding the2 voters, majority is now 6. > > First round: > A: 5 > B: 4 > C: 2 > > no majority, go to next round. > > Second round: > A: 7 > B: 4 > C: 6 > No. B:9. If you are going to claim that 2 others are wrong, please check your work before sending it out. > > A still wins. B does *not* win. Bucklin terminates when a majority is > found. > > Participation criterion from previous post: "Adding one or more ballots > that vote X over Y should never change the winner from X to Y" > > Showing the third preferences is confusing and irrelevant. I do not know > why Jameson approved "B wins." But even if B had won, it would not have > shown participation failure. The vote must change the result away from C to > another winner. > > One fact that should be understood about Bucklin: first of all, Bucklin > votes are *approvals*. Every explicit Bucklin vote is voting *for* the > candidate under the condition that the rank has been reached in the > amalgamation process. > > Secondly, a Bucklin ballot is a *Range* ballot, covering the approved > range only. So ranks may be left empty. Bucklin is *not* a pure ranked > system. So if a voter has A>B>C, the voter will *not* vote for all three, > unless there is some other worse candidates, or the voter really does want > to completely stand aside from the election. And that doesn't work with > respect to write-in candidates.... > > So if the voter has preferences A>B>C, the voter may vote, in the form of > Bucklin we generally are working with, called Bucklin-ER (equal ranking), > these votes, and all could be sincere: > > A > A>B > A>.>B (blank second rank) > A=B > > This *assumes* that there is a third candidate, C, that is least > preferred. If there are four candidates (or more), the voter can have *many > more sincere voting patterns*. > > Each pattern has implications about *preference strength*. That is part of > why I say that Bucklin uses a Range ballot. > > Suppose that the voter *really prefers* a candidate not on the ballot, and > wants to vote for that candidate, we'll call W. > > W > W>A > W>A>B > W>A=B > W>.>A > W>.>A=B > W=A>B > W=A>.>B > W=A=B > > Just to make this clear. >
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