> > Russell Standish wrote: > > >I really am trying to understand your argument. I know I'm from a > >different conceptual background, but somewhere either you or I have an > >incorrect concept. I can't accept a statement that A is equivalent to > >B obviously, when to my understanding A and B are such different things. > > I agree. We must work until we understand the roots of our > misunderstanding. > > >i) COMP means that I can survive the replacement of my brain by some > >Turing emulation. > > > Not really. Look at the UDA. COMP is 3 things: > > 1) = what you are saying (survive a substitution done at > the right digital level, which is supposed to exist) > > 2) Church thesis (I realise Schmidhuber does not cite it > explicitely!, but the use of the compiler theorem and the use of > his "great programmer" would not work without it). > > 3) Arithmetical Realism (here is Schmidhuber plenitude!!!). > Arithmetical Realism makes all steps of the UD work (Great Programmer's > work) existing independantly of me. >

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Aha - this is the source of one of our misunderstandings. You actually say this on page 1 of your thesis - I had just forgotten. As you say, Schmidhuber's Plenitude is really the conjunction of assumptions 2&3, so you explicitly assume Schmidhuber Plenitude in the first place. > > >I could well imagine conscious entities diagonalising the > >UD* output to generate an experience which is not an explicit > >computation. > > Well. This is false, and even importantly false. You point > here on my deeper motivation for Church thesis: the set of all > computable functions, and the set of all computations, i.e. UD* > is closed for diagonalisation. > This is exactly why Godel, who takes time to accept Church thesis, > called that thesis really a miracle. Fair enough - this was only a shot in the dark anyway. I was trying to relate my intuitive understanding of conscious projection to some formal mathematical process - diagonalisation is not the way to go. > > >Of course you can can compute the ensemble (UD*) - this follows from > >Schmidhuber's Plenitude. Also (in a sense) you can compute the > >wavefunction in Multiverse, which in turn defines a probability > >distribution. What you can't compute (or so it seems to me) is the > >outcome of a projection (1st postulate of consciousness). It is this > >projection that introduces randomness, or indeterminism into the 1st > >person view of the world. > > This is another point where we disagree. And the disagreement is > deep (but that is what makes our conversation genuine, isn'it?). > I say that the disagreement is deep because it is independant of > comp: it bears even on Everett's MWI. > In fact it seems to me that with your notion of "projection" you > are introducing a sort of collapse in comp! > But it is really computationnalism (in a weak sense) which has > helped Everett to prove QM does not need any collapses. > In comp, it is the same. The indeterminism is the consequence of > the way machines describe the statistics of their self-localisations > and other self-measures after the natural self-multiplication > and self-delocalisation forced by the UD. > If I duplicate you, nobody, including GOD or any quasi omniscient > being can predict what you will *feel* (1-person concept) precisely. > Like Everett, comp can predict that you will not feel the split. > > Bruno > It is a "sort" of collapse, however I would argue that this "collapse" is inherent in Everett's MWI anyway. However, before people go charging at the red flag I'm waving, I should point the very big difference between this and the Copenhagen wavefunction collapse. With Copenhagen, the wavefunction collapse is physical, i.e. to use your excellent terminology - is a 3-phenomenon. In my case, the projection, is merely the act of an observer resolving a measurement. It is a pure 1-phenomenon - a different observer will see a different projection (although clearly in their shared histories these observation need to be consistent). The picture as I see it is identical to the diagram you have on page 83 of your thesis. Now you seem to be saying that this projection is computable - ie Turing machines embedded within the ensemble are able to have first person experiences like this. This is the part I'm having trouble with. I seen some attempts to formulate Quantum measurement theory in terms of induced correlations between the environment and the observer (or measurement device) - eg Zurek's attempts in the late '80s, but none that I've been particularly satisfied with. Cheers ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr. Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, University of NSW Phone 9385 6967 Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965 Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks ----------------------------------------------------------------------------