Jacques M. Mallah wrote:

>> I keep telling you that I *do* take into account the number of copies.
>       Maybe you take it into account, but regardless of how you describe
>your views, it's clear that you don't take it to be directly proportional.

I am open to direct proportionality, it is not yet proved, nor even 
defined. With UD* the domains of uncertainty are at least (with n-steps 
histories for any integers n) infinite countable. So you should tell me
what mean "direct proportionality" here.

>       I see only 1 WR problem and it's not the 1-WR, but the WR, which
>is more or less solved.

Much more 'less' than 'more', IMO.

>> >    What I must explain is my now-experience.  It is plausibly one of
>> >many experiences that exist, both similar and at different times, and less
>> >similar and in different people.
>> OK.
>       Well, if you agree with that statement it's a major admission on
>your part.  From now on you're not allowed to claim that linkage of
>experiences over time is a problem or the like.

I don't see why. To explain the now-experience from the possible
inference of machines (or SAS) which are "reconstituted" sparsely in UD*,
you need to explain my now-belief in (at least apparence of) time space 
energy without using these concepts. I never see a problem with the 
of experiences over time, for time is a construct of atemporal possible
(consistent) experiences. The same for space, matter, and any 
physicalist predicates. CF the 1-invariance assertions in UDA.

>       As usual you don't understand much.  To be mortal, the expectation
>value over the measure distribution (of observer-moments) for your age
>must be finite, that's all.

Perhaps I could understand if you were a little more explicit.



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