Jacques M. Mallah wrote: >> I keep telling you that I *do* take into account the number of copies. > > Maybe you take it into account, but regardless of how you describe >your views, it's clear that you don't take it to be directly proportional.
I am open to direct proportionality, it is not yet proved, nor even clearly defined. With UD* the domains of uncertainty are at least (with n-steps histories for any integers n) infinite countable. So you should tell me what mean "direct proportionality" here. > I see only 1 WR problem and it's not the 1-WR, but the WR, which >is more or less solved. Much more 'less' than 'more', IMO. >> > What I must explain is my now-experience. It is plausibly one of >> >many experiences that exist, both similar and at different times, and less >> >similar and in different people. >> >> OK. > > Well, if you agree with that statement it's a major admission on >your part. From now on you're not allowed to claim that linkage of >experiences over time is a problem or the like. I don't see why. To explain the now-experience from the possible inference of machines (or SAS) which are "reconstituted" sparsely in UD*, you need to explain my now-belief in (at least apparence of) time space and energy without using these concepts. I never see a problem with the linkage of experiences over time, for time is a construct of atemporal possible (consistent) experiences. The same for space, matter, and any physicalist predicates. CF the 1-invariance assertions in UDA. > As usual you don't understand much. To be mortal, the expectation >value over the measure distribution (of observer-moments) for your age >must be finite, that's all. Perhaps I could understand if you were a little more explicit. Bruno.
