Russell Standish wrote: >Aha - this is the source of one of our misunderstandings. You actually >say this on page 1 of your thesis - I had just forgotten. As you say, >Schmidhuber's Plenitude is really the conjunction of assumptions 2&3, >so you explicitly assume Schmidhuber Plenitude in the first place.

## Advertising

I'm glad you realise that! > ... >Fair enough - this was only a shot in the dark anyway. I was trying to >relate my intuitive understanding of conscious projection to some >formal mathematical process - diagonalisation is not the way to go. OK. Note that I *do* think diagonalisation has something to do with (high form of) self-consciousness. Mainly for "jumping out of oneself". A similar idea has been proposed by Hofstadter in his GEB book. In computer science self-reference is handled by a sort of double diagonalisation. The basic idea is simple: let D be a self-applier operator, i.e. D(X) gives X(X) (D is really a duplicator in fact). D captures the first diagonalisation. Then apply D to itself (second diagonalisation) and you get the self-replicator: D(D) gives D(D). >It is a "sort" of collapse, however I would argue that this "collapse" >is inherent in Everett's MWI anyway. However, before people go >charging at the red flag I'm waving, ... ...provocating red flag indeed! >I should point the very big >difference between this and the Copenhagen wavefunction collapse. With >Copenhagen, the wavefunction collapse is physical, i.e. to use your >excellent terminology - is a 3-phenomenon. In my case, the projection, >is merely the act of an observer resolving a measurement. It is a pure >1-phenomenon - a different observer will see a different projection >(although clearly in their shared histories these observation need to >be consistent). The picture as I see it is identical to the diagram >you have on page 83 of your thesis. Exactly. >Now you seem to be saying that this projection is computable - ie >Turing machines embedded within the ensemble are able to have first >person experiences like this. The fact is that if I survive teleportation through comp, I will survive duplication and I will not been able to predict with certainty the result, as I measure it myself, of the self-duplication. But the mystery of ``reawakening" is no greater in the duplication than in the simple teleportation case. >This is the part I'm having trouble >with. I seen some attempts to formulate Quantum measurement theory in >terms of induced correlations between the environment and the observer >(or measurement device) - eg Zurek's attempts in the late '80s, but >none that I've been particularly satisfied with. That's OK and I think Zurek contribution is important and could help us to bridge the gap between 3-experiment and 1-experience. But I don't think it is need for the projection case of self-duplication. It will be useful in any case (including simple teleportation, or even the experiment "do nothing, stay conscious"). *** Now I answer a question you made about the UDA. It is related to the search of "effective probability" (Mallah's term); the definition of observer moments, etc. (actually: the current thread "Renormalisation"). >> BM: Exercice: why should we search a measure on the computational >> continuations and not just the computational states? Hint: with >> just the computational states only, COMP predicts white noise for >> all experiences. (ok Chris ?). With the continuations, a priori >> we must just hunt away the 'white rabbit' continuations. >> You can also show that Schmidhuber's 'universal prior' solution >> works only in the case the level of substitution >> is so low that my generalised brain is the entire multiverse. >> > >RS: Again, I do not know what you mean by this last comment. Damned! Professional duties call for. I'l go back to this 'exercice' ASAP. Bruno