George Levy wrote:

>I agree that COMP implies first person indeterminacy but, >as far as I know, it does not predict Schroedinger Equation in all >its splendor, including Planck's constant which is a parameter in >this equation. So would it be more accurate to >say COMP implies Indeterminacy + MW? (abbreviation explain below) I am happy you see that COMP implies Indeterminacy + MW. But the entire UDA TE shows that the mind-body problem is reduced to extracting the physical laws for the measure on that indeterminacy. This explain at least the philosophical shape of QM. And it shows that COMP entails SE is SE is correct. And Church thesis entails constraints which made that measure isolation possible. (Even by pure self-observation or by interviewing the self-observing universal machine). And here we get a sort of double quantum logic which I should explain more (but then we need mathematical logic). MW Many Worlds (World in a large large sense) UD Universal Dovetailer. It is a program which generates and executes all programs. It exists by CT UD* The infinite trace of a UD. (a big fractal). UDA Universal Dovetailer Argument (m1726 in the archive, or my thesis). WR White rabbit or flying pig SE Schroedinger Equation TE Thought Experiment [] Necessary >I have reached almost the same conclusion, that our consciousness come >about from >an ensemble of more or less identical "points" or states in the plenitude >and the >"thickness" of this ensemble is a measure of the Heisenberg >uncertainty. The >difference is that you call them "computation." I view them more as >instantaneous >static entities which are logically connected to each other. Maybe we could >resolve this issue by saying that I focus on the points of the graph and >you, on >the links :-) I also use the COMP hypothesis which help by giving both TEs, and precise mathematical theories. It is frequent that focusing on point and focusing on links are related by dualities. With the Z logics the links are really topological. I think I have shown a way to derive the thickness from the turing-tropic views. >> [BM] Locally a brain/body/universe only makes it >> possible for a person (the one conscious) to accelerate himself >> relatively to its most probable possible extensions. Note that this gives >> a role to consciousness : self-speeding up abilities. >> And this is linked to another result by Godel. If you add an undecidable >> true statement to the theory (in which that sentence is undecidable), not >> only an infinity of new formula become decidable, but an infinity of >> provable formula get shorter proofs. >> > >You are accelerating too fast for me... I don't understand this at all. You just need some knowledge in mathematical logics. I will think for a good book. (Godel speed-up paper is in the Davis 65). >> Merging is allowed through amnesia. In some sense personal memories >> help you to stay into no merging histories. > >I smell a whiff of third person thinking. I'll say something, then I'll >retract >it because I just don't have the words to say it straight. An observer in >world A >who has a "false" memory (of something that did not happen in world A), >is in >the same mental state as an observer in world B who has a true memory ( of >something that happended in world B). The two observers are in exactly >identical >states, even though their "shared histories" are different. OK... >The point is that >their mental states are the same, they have the same consciousness, they are >really the same observer and they are really in the same world. The observer defines the worlds in which they live. The expression "an observer is or belongs in a universe" is not well defined with comp. if the false memory has a bad influence relatively to a non negligeable set of consistent continuation for an observer, then and only then that "false memory" has a (relative) meaning and *is* indeed relatively false. >Now I can retract what I said. There is no world A and B and there is no >shared >history. The important thing is only the current state of the observer(s). >The >extensions to the observer are fuzzy. But they are relatively real and why not consider them important too especially when one want understand the laws of physics from them. The set of consistent extensions is perhaps fuzzy, but they are mathematically well defined (with some assumptions). >Precisely. With respect to us!. We are the machine....it's a vicious >circle...we >are self emergent...Not only is our world anthropically defined, but we >ourselves >also are.... Turing-tropic instead. That the simple shift I do. There is a nice mathematical way to interview the self introspecting honest machine. (BTW and by Solovay there are *two* nice utterly non trivial ways). >Your use of the words "shared histories" partially seem to carry some old >fashioned baggage from the days when time was thought to be linear. >Yet you do accept the concept of bifurcation and merging... I don't understand. The guys after the self-duplication in W M share their life stories until the duplication. I talk of sharing because of bifurcation, and merging. >Can conventional mechanics support consciousness spliting and merging? I >don't >think so. That would just mean conventional mechanics is incompatible with comp. That is quite possible. QM *is* compatible with comp, perhaps even a consequence. >[...] >The point is that merging seems to be possible but splitting is difficult. >You >could have splitting of consciousness, if, instead of considering >consciousness as >a single point represented by definite states, you are willing to consider >a fuzzy >region comprised of a multitude of points. This is exactly what happen with comp. Consciousness is represented by the set of all consistent extensions. That gives, it seems, the right "fuzzy region". >This type of consciousness fuzzy region) would make >indeterminacy MANDATORY! In practice the existence of this fuzzy region is >hinted >at by Planck's constant. Why mandatory? Not planck constant but the existence of planck constant is related with the fact that comp entails that if we look below our level of substitution we can get information from the proximate "parallel" computational histories. Bruno PS I get the following "Re: Transporter Paradox". It seems at first sight you just affirm comp is false there. for exemple you wrote: >If the transporter was perfect, then, obviously, the copies would have >to be >perfect. This means they would have to include all their extensions which >includes >clothing, close environments and far environments. To be rigorous, let's >say that all >the environment withing a light cone of the observer is reproduced by the >transporter >such that no information can possibly be lost. This just mean you put the level very low. But comp just say that there is a level such that a perfect transporter exists in principle. The UD will patiently get it and simulate you (infinitely often) + all the infinitely many variations ... To make comp false there would be no level at all! The rest of your post is incorrect. Either comp is right and then the UD will emulate all correct "transporter" or comp is false and then what I say does not follow ... so "easily" indeed!. >Bruno's assumption that indeterminacy can be deduced from >COMP is faulty. You change your mind but I don't see why. I guess you belief (momentarily I hope) that I pretend comp true. I never do that. I just pretend that if comp is true *then* physics is eventually a branch of machine's theology, biology, psychology (choose your word). Once comp is true the DU duplicates exactly infinitely often and with the invariance lemma your anticipation (including f=ma) are determind by the topological structure of that set of consistent continuations. Bruno