Robert W. wrote in part:

>One must realize in the attempt to constrain common
>everyday experience to a finite conceptual space,
>that something will be lost in the translation.


Brent Meeker answered in part
(to Robert W., in the invisible post):


>> Of course, ineffable mystical experiences will be
>> left out. 


Is not consciousness the first ineffable experience?
At least it seems to me that consciousness in unprovable,
uncommunicable. You can just hope people understand what 
you say by having had similar experiences.

This is one of my motivation for thinking that consciousness
and consistency share the formula:

       -[]c       

Saying just that c (consistency, consciousness) is not provable,
not finitely communicable, ... ineffable?

Goedel's second theorem: c -> -[]c    (c = <>TRUE, or -[]FALSE).

Bruno

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