On 07-May-01, Marchal wrote:
> Robert W. wrote in part:
>> One must realize in the attempt to constrain common
>> everyday experience to a finite conceptual space,
>> that something will be lost in the translation.
> Brent Meeker answered in part
> (to Robert W., in the invisible post):
>>> Of course, ineffable mystical experiences will be
>>> left out.
> Is not consciousness the first ineffable experience?
In a sense it is - but in another sense it is the *only* thing we do
talk about, our conscious experiences and thoughts. Freud made a
career of supposing that some things we say come from an unconscious,
but this seems doubtful to me - or to be more precise most of my
thinking is unconscious, but what I say is one of the things I'm most
> At least it seems to me that consciousness in unprovable,
That's why I'm intrigued by your project to capture consciousness in
computation (whatever that means); whereas Robert W. seems irritated by
You can just hope people understand what
> you say by having had similar experiences.
> This is one of my motivation for thinking that consciousness
> and consistency share the formula:
> Saying just that c (consistency, consciousness) is not provable,
> not finitely communicable, ... ineffable?
> Goedel's second theorem: c -> -c (c = <>TRUE, or -FALSE).
There may be more than just a poetic analogy; although the unprovable
but true formulae that Godel's theorem exhibits are not at all
ineffable. They are just like the other WFF's and can be added as
P.S. Bruno, I have added you to my file of tag-line quotes - I hope you
"Logic is just a polite way of helping people (including oneself) to
they have prejudices."
-- Bruno Marchal