> > Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > I don't think we ever discussed the concept of attributing > > consciousness to inanimate objects before Hans came along. > > But I think you DID agree to attribute consciousness to > purely abstract entities, notably mathematically defined > universes containing SASes.
Correct. This is the definition of SAS. That we don't yet have a reasonable definition of either SAS or consciousness is not a cause of concern. It just means there is more work to be done. > > I merely pointed out that it is possible, even natural > and common, to map such abstractions containing > self-aware systems onto many things we commonly encounter. > Anthropomorphism may be common, but this doesn't mean it is correct, nor useful. > This violates some reflexive assumptions you carry, many > instilled by a western education. > Those assumptions badly need to be violated. > > They may have been good during our recent naive materialist > phase of development, but that phase is ending. > This list's discussion topic is one symptom of that end, as > are looming questions about conscious machines. > > Other traditions have no problem seeing minds in > inanimate objects, when such interpretation facilitates > interaction. That acceptance has much to do with the > Japanese comfortable acceptance of robots. > > Western stinginess in attributing minds, on the other > hand, is becoming a Luddite-rousing impediment to progress. > How so? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr. Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, University of NSW Phone 9385 6967 Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965 Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
