> Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > I don't think we ever discussed the concept of attributing
> > consciousness to inanimate objects before Hans came along.
> But I think you DID agree to attribute consciousness to
> purely abstract entities, notably mathematically defined
> universes containing SASes.

Correct. This is the definition of SAS. That we don't yet have a
reasonable definition of either SAS or consciousness is not a cause of
concern. It just means there is more work to be done.

> I merely pointed out that it is possible, even natural
> and common, to map such abstractions containing
> self-aware systems onto many things we commonly encounter.

Anthropomorphism may be common, but this doesn't mean it is correct,
nor useful.

> This violates some reflexive assumptions you carry, many
> instilled by a western education.
> Those assumptions badly need to be violated.
> They may have been good during our recent naive materialist
> phase of development, but that phase is ending.
> This list's discussion topic is one symptom of that end, as
> are looming questions about conscious machines.
> Other traditions have no problem seeing minds in
> inanimate objects, when such interpretation facilitates
> interaction.  That acceptance has much to do with the
> Japanese comfortable acceptance of robots.
> Western stinginess in attributing minds, on the other
> hand, is becoming a Luddite-rousing impediment to progress.

How so?

Dr. Russell Standish                    Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW                       Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052                             Fax   9385 6965
Australia                               [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Room 2075, Red Centre                   http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks

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