Brent Meeker wrote:
>I think I agree with Hal. The question seems particularly tricky in
>English because "you" is ambigously singular and plural. If you avoid
>this ambiguity the question becomes, "Where will you two feel to be
>after the experiment?" But the question isn't being asked of "you two"
>but only of "you".
No problem with that. I have often explain the UDA in french, which
is ambiguous only in the majestative form! ("vous" is the plural
"you" but also the "polite" singular "you").
This ambiguity is just "real", but is disambiguised (if that is english)
by the careful distinction of the first and third person. No?
>The question is also unanswerable in the second form refering to the
>superposed photon states. But not because of the ambiguity of "you"
>but simply because there is no way to know the answer. It' like
>asking, "I'm going to flip this coin. Will you see it come down heads
>or will you see it tails?"
... and that is exactly what I am trying to show.
If you flip the coin I would answer there is some chance
that I will see it "pile" and some chance I will see it
"face". And if you duplicate me in W and M, I would say there
is some chance I will see Washington, and there is some chance
I will see Moscow.
Perhaps you will tell me that the probability with the
coin is verifiable and sharable *among* observers, unlike
apparently the experience of the duplicated people.
In that case, put the 3-observer inside the duplication
box! You duplicate two people, the experiencer and the
"3-observer" which of course becomes "1-observer", and becomes
"entangled" two the experiencer's diary, so that they can
make bets on the result and share the 1-indeterminacies. This
is what I call the first person plural indeterminacies.
Everett uses it in his paper, imo.