Sorry for the delay, but I am web-connected only at work, and at
work ..., well I have to work, sometimes :-)
>> My first question, Joel, is simply : does this makes sense for
>> you? Can you imagine saying yes to the doctor?
> Sure. Sign me up!
> (as you know, I already think we are software :)
> Next question I suppose..
OK. I see you *are* a "computationalist" !
The next questions are so easy that I will answer them for you, if
you don't mind.
It will be useful later having numbered the questions. If you
disagree somewhere just tell me ('course).
Question 2: Do you agree using (classical) teleportation? Are you
willing to use the European Teleportation Link Service Inc. They
can make you "read" and "destroyed" at Sofia and then they build
you from the description (which has been send by the traditionnal
post (nothing is perfect)) at Brussels.
Because you say we are software I can guess you will ask me to
sign you up again.
So let us go to the next question.
Question 3: The next question introduces the 3-person
(3-observer, ...) and the 1-person.
We can define (for a beginning) the first-person description by the
content of his/her personal private diary, or by his/her personal
memory. What matters is that the diary/memory follows the comp
practionners. In particular, during your Sofia-Brussels trip, your
diary/memory is destroyed in Sophia and recover in Brussels.
The 3-person is just the content of the public (or scientific) diary
of an external observer. Her/his memory is not destroyed.
Let us consider the Sofia-Brussels' trip. I suppose also that
the reconstitution box at Brussels has no windows. Do you agree
that if an arbitrary delay of recontitution is introduced at Brussels,
so that the 3-description describes a longer, and so a different
experiment, still the 1-description will not changed. That is the
1-person description (written in the box immediately after the
reconstitution) does not mention the delay. Do you agree if I say
that from the 1-person point of view there is no delay or that the
person does not feel, does not remembered, is not aware of, the
Well, as a computationalist I'm afraid you will feel insulted by
a so easy question, so you will say yes. Isn't it?
So here is question 4. It *seems* innocuous. You take the tele-trip
again from Sofia to Brussels. Could the fact that you survive that
trip depends on very far (not even in your light cone if you want)
Because you made allusion to the independance of the computations
I guess you will agree.
In that case I can almost deduce that you will say yes also
to question 5.
Question 5: do you agree you will survive the *duplication*
experiment where you are read and destroyed at Brussels and then
you are reconstituted (simultaneously or not) both at
Washington and Moscow? I just ask you if you think you will
survive *that* experiment. Well I ask you also if you agree
that the Joel in Moscow and the Joel in Washington have the
same "joelness right".
Here is question 6. Perhaps the first not so obvious one.
Do you agree that, if I ask you at Brussels, before the
Washington-Moscow duplication experiment: "Where will you *feel*
to be after the experiment will be completed?" that although
you can answer "you will see me at Washington and at Moscow",
your first person diary will either contain "I am at Moscow" or
I am at Washington" so that you cannot predict with certainty
where you will feel to be?"
PS I hope I'm clear. I'm interrupt each five minutes by collegues.
Works would improved in the world if we eliminate all collegues :-)
I hope also I'm not too boring. It is necessary to be quite clear
at the beginning.