Brent Meeker wrote:
>On 10-Oct-01, Marchal wrote:
>> You talk like if you have a proof of the existence of matter. Like if
>> it was
>> obvious subtancia are consistent. But you know substancia only appears
>> in Aristote mind when he misunderstood Plato doctrine on intelligible
>> (My opinion!). Despite the formidable success of physics, the main
>> problems are not solved: neither qualitative appearance, nor (the new
>> problem which appears through the comp hypothesis), the problem of the
>> qualitative *appearance* of matter and quantities.
>I don't see this as an either-or question.
But it was a neither-nor affirmation. I'm just saying that
with comp you need to explain *both* mind and matter.
With (naive) materialism you need to explain only mind, for
matter is taken as granted (more or less at some level).
>That everything is
>computational is an hypothesis and is everything is material.
You mean "as is everything is material. "?
Be careful. I certainly does not believe everything is computational.
Quite the contrary, IF I am the result of a computation then I can expect
to be confronted with many non computational things.
Perhaps you were meaning "everything is immaterial"? That's is
indeed a consequence of the computational hypothesis.
>should pursue every hypothesis as far as we can and see what we get.
Right. David Deutsch insists on that idea too. Note that we
choose the hypotheses which seduces us in a way or another ...
>Some will be proven wrong - Newtonian mechanics. Some will be found
>vacuous - God did it. But the rest we should pursue. Some may work
>out and they may even prove to be all different versions of the same