It seems unlikely that it could be otherwise. Presumably the impulse to make a decision has to originate from a lower level, assuming that consciousness is supported by layers of unconscious processing? However the decisions in question were to do with when to perform a simple action - pressing a key, or something similar. What about conscious decisions that are arrived at by evaluating evidence, weighing possibilities, etc? Presumably they are also supported by unconscious layers which know how to evaluate evidence etc... Surely the feeling of free will comes from us not being aware of these underlying processes.
Charles > -----Original Message----- > From: Brent Meeker [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Wednesday, 24 October 2001 9:34 a.m. > To: rwas > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: ODP: Free will/consciousness/ineffability > > > Whatever free will is, it is very doubtful that it depends on > consciousness. See Daniel Dennett's dicussion of the Grey > Walter carousel > experiment. This experiment shows (although there is a > little ambiguity > left) that free will decisions occure *before* on is > conscious of them. > > Brent Meeker > The freedom of the will consists in the fact that future > actions cannot > be known now. > --- Ludwig Wittgenstein >