George Levy wrote
>Free will stems from perceived indeterminacy in the behavior of a person >or a program. This indeterminacy could either be physical in nature >(quantics) or mathematical (Godelian). I believe that both physical >indeterminacy and mathematical indeterminacy will eventually be proven >to be identical. Bruno Marchal may be on his way to doing this. I think >that Godel ndeterminacy could be made relativistic: it could depend on >the axiomatic system used, with an arbitrary number of systems rather >than the only two systems suggested by Bruno: G and G*. G and G* are *meta*mathematical systems, bearing on *any* consistent sufficiently rich axiomatics systems. I prefer to talk in term of sound universal machines, because "enough rich" = capable of representing the programmable functions. But G and G* are indeed the psychology of (any consistent) *individual* machines. But G and G* can be extended to allow comparisons between two or more machines. >Unfortunately I >>am not a good enough mathematician to carry out this task. Nor am I. But this has not been necessary for deriving the quantum sort of relativity. The Everett hilbertian relativity of states. (Thanks to the work of Solovay, Boolos, Goldblatt, Visser ...). I get only the shadows, but exactly where they were expected (from UDA), which I take as an evidence for both comp and QM. Bruno
