Gordon wrote:

>Even if your right Physics found that Comp and the Physical world where
>related through the Philosophy of the Physical hence Objects.
>I agree that our idea of Reality are hard to prove but that mite be just
>down to or Language and nothing to do with the rest of Natures rules.
>Before most thought that at the Quantum level it wasn't real.At that
>time Classical Physics had the Vector Potential which most took as not
>real just a math Object in the mind however AB EFFECT should that not
>only on the Quantum level it's real effect but it kicks back, now in our
>words may make this non real again but Nature has a better Language than
>us.Recently Physicist who thought that the Wave was just something of
>Math in there head have said "I have to go pack it and think again about
>how I see the world" this was after seeing the IBM stuff on
>Scan-Tunneling Microscope Quantum corral.We are along way from the
>finished Physical Program yet!

You talk like if Nature necessarily exists in some primary sense, and
that math are just tools for the mind.
I am quite realist about numbers. Numbers kicks back in their own way.

David Deutsch defends such type of number realism. Actually FOR
endorses the three points which defined what I called comp.

And I am just saying  look, if comp is taken seriously enough we 
*have* to derive 'quantum computation' from what machines can possibly
expect from their possible consistent computational histories.
So I point on some work which *needs* to be done (and btw on some modest
parts which has been done!).
And, as gift, we get light on the mind body problem but also on the
origin of physical laws.

About the "finished Physical Program" I agree with you, both empirists
and hard theoreticists are just nibbling the reality beast.
I wouldn't be so astonished that comp makes possible to prove the
impossibility of any unifying physical toes like if the set of
elementary entities was not closed for diagonalisation: give me your
particuls and I will show you a new one:) That is, although comp is 
ontologically "anti-empirical", it is almost quite sure that comp
entails that some part of numberland can only be known by experimentation.
(both from third and first person point of view).
There will be forever machines saying as Rabi "who asks for that?"

Would it be so astonishing for you that the fabric of reality relies
eventually on cohering sheafs of deep and sharable "dreams" (i.e. some 
computations viewed from abstract (platonic) machines)?


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