Gordon wrote: >Even if your right Physics found that Comp and the Physical world where >related through the Philosophy of the Physical hence Objects. >I agree that our idea of Reality are hard to prove but that mite be just >down to or Language and nothing to do with the rest of Natures rules. > >Before most thought that at the Quantum level it wasn't real.At that >time Classical Physics had the Vector Potential which most took as not >real just a math Object in the mind however AB EFFECT should that not >only on the Quantum level it's real effect but it kicks back, now in our >words may make this non real again but Nature has a better Language than >us.Recently Physicist who thought that the Wave was just something of >Math in there head have said "I have to go pack it and think again about >how I see the world" this was after seeing the IBM stuff on >Scan-Tunneling Microscope Quantum corral.We are along way from the >finished Physical Program yet!
You talk like if Nature necessarily exists in some primary sense, and that math are just tools for the mind. I am quite realist about numbers. Numbers kicks back in their own way. David Deutsch defends such type of number realism. Actually FOR endorses the three points which defined what I called comp. And I am just saying look, if comp is taken seriously enough we *have* to derive 'quantum computation' from what machines can possibly expect from their possible consistent computational histories. So I point on some work which *needs* to be done (and btw on some modest parts which has been done!). And, as gift, we get light on the mind body problem but also on the origin of physical laws. About the "finished Physical Program" I agree with you, both empirists and hard theoreticists are just nibbling the reality beast. I wouldn't be so astonished that comp makes possible to prove the impossibility of any unifying physical toes like if the set of elementary entities was not closed for diagonalisation: give me your particuls and I will show you a new one:) That is, although comp is ontologically "anti-empirical", it is almost quite sure that comp entails that some part of numberland can only be known by experimentation. (both from third and first person point of view). There will be forever machines saying as Rabi "who asks for that?" Would it be so astonishing for you that the fabric of reality relies eventually on cohering sheafs of deep and sharable "dreams" (i.e. some computations viewed from abstract (platonic) machines)? Bruno
