Joel wrote

>Bruno:
>> The formulations are as numerous than the philosophical systems.
>>
>> For a materialist the problem is to explain what are the necessary
>> and sufficient conditions for having the feeling of pain in a leg.
>
>Consider me a materialist then, I suppose.

In the literature a materialist is someone who believes in a 
physical (or material) universe, and nothing else.

I called ``weak materialist" someone who believes in a physical
universe and also in something else (number, game, justice, for
naming a few examples).

Now I am afraid that even ``weak materialism" is hardly compatible
with computationalism (which you are using in your TOE approach).

Most on this list, I think, are willing to accept the idea that
"materiality" occurs in mathematical structures, as seen from
inside by some SSA.
What I try to show is that, if you accept the comp hypothesis (under
the form of the survival through digital substitution, with survival
in the "great mother" psychology sense) then you must substitute
the mathematical structure by sort of continuous sheaf of possible
first person histories. This happens at a very basic level, and I
illustrate it formally with the logic of self-reference in my thesis).
In the process I illustrate the loss of explicativeness of the
concept of "empirical realities", but I have also a direct 
argument.

>> The mind body admit a lot of subproblem, like what is free-will
>
>An illusion.

An illusion? That is a rather quick answer. Let us not enter into
that perenial debate. Perhaps I should ask you exemple of what is
not an illusion, what is your ontology. 
I should have you ask this before, if your TOE is a cellular
automata, what does execute it?

>>  is there an afterdeath,
>
>Yes.

That rather quick too! Amazing for a materialist, plausible for
a computationalist, I guess. But then I don't believe
materialism being compatible with computationalism.


>Qualia are internal states.

Right! (imo). But "internal" in which sense? Would you agree that
it is related with the first person viewpoint.

>Ok, thank you Bruno.  I think I understand the terminology now (first and
>third person viewpoints), but I fail to see the importance of it all.

If you want I open a new thread. I send you a post with one question.
Normally if you are computationalist you will answer yes. The same
for the second post, etc. At the end you will understand (or at least 
to have an idea) the importance of it all. OK? If you prefer, read the
UDA. You can ask me question or challenge me on the reasoning.


>For the record: I think the third person point of view does not exist.
>Confirmation is never permanent and can always be unconfirmed.  (i.e. One of
>the observers on the phone can later admit that she or he was lying, or
>confused.)  For each of us, there is only the first person.

We certainly have some acquaintance with ourself from the first person
point of view (and even the third ). I dont' see why we should not trying
most objective possible theories of realities, though. 
Of course such theories are always sort of "anticipation", but that 
game is part of science and even consciousness. 
Nevertheless I believe that the fact that 17 is prime is 
3-person (objective) verifiable. It is a sharable
reality.

>> If your cellular automata generates everythings it will do it in an
>> extraordinary terrible redundant way. The computational indeterminacy
>> must be quantified on the set of *all* consistent continuations.
>
>Huh?  What does that mean?


Let us take your cellular automata which generates everything.
You will be generated at some "moment" (where the moment can be defined
in the universal cellular automata terms).
The problem is that you will be generated infinitely often, and your
average "next" first person point of view depends on all the consistent
computational continuations generated by your universal automata.
(See the UDA, or answer yes for my thread proposition if you want).
The basic point comes from the fact that from you first person
point of view you cannot be aware of 10^billion moments between the 
generation of similar next instant.
Like in quantum physics there is eventually a sum over infinities 
of histories which are needed here.

Bruno








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