Joel:
>>What is the mind-body problem?

Bruno:
> The formulations are as numerous than the philosophical systems.
>
> For a materialist the problem is to explain what are the necessary
> and sufficient conditions for having the feeling of pain in a leg.

Consider me a materialist then, I suppose.

> The mind body admit a lot of subproblem, like what is free-will

An illusion.

>  is there an afterdeath,

Yes.

> what is the nature of qualia, etc.

Qualia are internal states.

> A third person description is a verifiable one by an external (not
> duplicated) observer. It can contain something like "Joel wakes up
> successfully in both Washington and Moscow. It has been confirmed by
> two phonecalls, etc."

Ok, thank you Bruno.  I think I understand the terminology now (first and
third person viewpoints), but I fail to see the importance of it all.

For the record: I think the third person point of view does not exist.
Confirmation is never permanent and can always be unconfirmed.  (i.e. One of
the observers on the phone can later admit that she or he was lying, or
confused.)  For each of us, there is only the first person.

> If your cellular automata generates everythings it will do it in an
> extraordinary terrible redundant way. The computational indeterminacy
> must be quantified on the set of *all* consistent continuations.

Huh?  What does that mean?

Joel


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