Juergen wrote (among things):

>But how to answer an ill-posed question?  You promise that "time and
>space will disappear at the end of the reasoning", but your question
>is about delays, and how can we speak about delays without defining
>time? Simulation time? Real time? Both? How? There is no way to continue
>without formal framework.

We were doing a thought experiment. I haven't say that the delays were
virtual. This is done much later in the reasoning. Of course, as George
Levy says the permutation real/virtual makes no changes in the first
person point of view, and does not change the distribution either.

IF we accept COMP we survive with
an artificial brain (Well: in case we were betting on a correct level
of substitution).
That means the doctor scan (at the right level) your brain, destroy
it, and then from the recollected information he builds a new one.
The state of the artificial brain mirrors the state of your brain.
You survive (with comp!).
 
Now let us suppose the doctor keeps the information hidden in a drawer 
during one year. 
Real time delay, in the every day-type of life.
After that delay he makes the "reconstitution".
I am just saying that, with comp, from the point of view of the 
one who survive, that delay cannot be perceived. It has not influence
the kept information of your brain.
>From the first person point of view the delay introduced by the doctor
has not been and cannot been directly perceived.
(that's why I insist sometimes that reconstition booth has no windows!).

Are you seeing my point ? It does also not change first person perception
in case of self-multiplication.



>There is no way to continue without formal framework.



I isolate a unique formalisation by an informal reasoning. To formalise
at this stage would automatically  put the mind-body problem 
under the rug. A TOE which doesn't address (at least) the mind-body
problem is a TOS (a theory of *some* thing).

But as I show below, those self-multiplication are easily 
formalised (at least the third person description of those experiment
are easily formalised). You can easily write a program which multiplied
yourself (still betting on a correct level of course) relatively to 
virtual environments. 

Are you among those who argues that talk on consciousness is a hoax ?
How do you manage consciousness in your TOE-approach?
How do you relate consciousness and computation.
I'm afraid you are making "unspoken assumption" about the 
mind/body/computation relation all along  your work.


>What exactly is this indeterminacy?

Let us reiterate the self-duplications, applied on you, 16 times.
I ask to all (2^16) Schmidhubers if they can predict the W,M
sequences appearing on their T-shirt.
Some, like WWMWWMWWWWMMMMMM will pretend that the sequence is 
computable: it is indeed the beginning of the binary 
developpement of PI.  Most will accept it is just not computable.

To make things a little more formal, you can program that
self-multiplication, including yourself as a subroutine, and
making Washington and Moscow virtual.
In particular the UD does that. But I am still anticipating.



>Is the distribution computable?
>How does the distribution depend on your delays and other computable (?)
>things?

The point is that the "credibility-distribution", whatever form
it will take, cannot depend, with comp, on arbitrary delays for the
reconstitutions. Nor can it depend on space, nor on any subtance ...
(I anticipate, but you can read my CC&Q paper, cf my URL below).





In another post you say:


>Yes. My point is: as long as we are not forced by evidence, why assume
>the existence of something we cannot describe or analyze in principle?


If I fall from a flying plane, being a realist (though not a 
subtancialist) I believe I will fall somewhere, although I have
no means to describe or analyse where.

Just to see how much constructive philosopher you are,
if you have the time, tell me if you accept the 
following proof ?  Perhaps you know it.


Proposition: There is a couple of irrational numbers (x,y) 
such that x^y is rational.

Proof: we know (since Pythagore) that sqr(2) is irrational.

Now, either (sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2)) is rational, and the case is closed.

or (sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2)) is irrational, but then

((sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2))) ^ (sqr(2)) , which is equal to 2 (rational)

provide the solution.

So we know for sure that either (sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2))
or ((sqr(2)) ^ (sqr(2))) ^ (sqr(2)) provide the solution, although
we don't know which one. Do you accept we have nevertheless
prove that there exists couple of irrational numbers (x,y) 
such that x^y is rational ?

(The problem with constructive philosophy is that there are
quite a lot of them. I am trying to find which one).

Bruno






http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal



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