With (classical) comp it exists a level such that we survive
a Washington-Moscou self-duplication where the reconstitution
are made at that level (WM).
(Later I will prove that no machine can ever know its correct
levels of substitution, but still a machine could guess one
correctly, and that is all we need in the reasoning).
Here is the "precise question" I promise. We agree that
in the WM self-duplication experiment there is an uncertainty
about where "I" will find myself after it has been done.
This does not mean we have chosen the uniform distribution
(P(W) = P(M) = 1/2)) to modelise this uncertainty.
Now suppose that at Moscow we delaye the reconstitution. Do
you agree it cannot change the distribution of uncertainty?
That is: whatever ways you choose to modelize the first-person
uncertainty in self-multiplication experience/experiment,
comp entails it must remain invariant with respect to
arbitrary delays introduced in the reconstitutions.
We don't know the distribution. But we know it is invariant
for the addition of delays.
Do you agree ?
1) Of course I know that you do not accept COMP, which
includes a minimal amount of arithmetical realism.
That is not a problem because I don't ask people to believe
in COMP, just to believe that my thesis shows that COMP
entails the REVERSAL. Too bad: you will miss both
the solution of the mind-body problem *and* the origin
of the physical laws.
Note that I am used to people abandoning COMP when they begin
to understand the reversal.
2) It does not mean I believe your are consistent. This
is because if you believe there is a "great programmer" I can
prove to you the existence of uncomputable functions, which
you should'nt accept with your constructive move. I guess
you know that there is no Universal Machines computing all
and only the total (or those with recursive domain) computable
Another exemple: you cannot use Lowenheim-Skolem theorem,
like in your last post, for your constructive purpose,
'cause the Lowenheim -Skolem theorem does not admit
constructive proof (and necessarily so according to a result
by McNeil and Tennant). But the biggest problem for a
constructive philosopher is the "other mind" problem. A
constructivist cannot really believe in another "person",
still less understand the 1/3-person differences.
A constructivist approach of the mind-body problem leads
necessarily toward solipsism.