On Fri, Jul 05, 2002 at 12:05:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > But from the point of view of the *conscious* observer there is > an intrinsical ignorance (for sound machine) about *which* histories > he/it/she/they participate, and the uda thougth experiment shows that in > some sense we belong to all, but we differentiate along consistent many path. > We face a measure problem. Actually we face two measure problems, due to > the 1/3 distinction.
Here is something basic in your ideas which I've never understood. What does "conscious observer" have to do with "sound machine"? I understand that an observer can be considered as a machine, but how can an observer be sound or not sound? Soundness as far as I understand it applies to an axiomatic theory, that is, the theory is sound if you can't deduce "false" from its axioms. Now if you have a machine that enumerates theorems of an axiomatic theory, maybe you can say that it's sound if the theory itself is sound. But obviously an observer is not a theorem producing machine, so what does it mean for an observer to be a sound machine?
