At 16:25 +0200 11/10/1996, Saibal Mitra wrote:

>You can still have realism, but it must be the case that at least some of
>the things we think of as ``real physical objects´´ like e.g. electrons are
>not real.

What would that mean? What would be real? Even in my thesis, electrons
are supposed to have some degree of reality like relative stability
as mind pattern in normal machine dreams (1-person plural histories)
for example.

>Suppose you are a virtual person, programmed by me and living in a virtual
>environment. You do some experiments to find the laws of physics. You try to
>break up things and look what they are ``made of´´. Would you ever discover
>how the pentium processor works if you proceed this way?

With comp I will still be able to deduce the laws of physics ...
I could miss some intermediate level. This will depends of the story
through which you come to implement "me".

>Similarly would you ever discover anything about neurotransmitters and
>neurons while you are asleep (and dreaming about doing experiments).

I guess no. That level of description is too high.

>It is more likely that you would be stuck with theories that promote
>nonexisting artefacts of  the virtual world to real physical entities.

Not if I begin to suspect comp is true. I will stop to promote
anything as real physical entities, except those dream invariants
shared by all "physical" dreams.
(I recall that dream = computations "observed" from a 1-person (plural)
point of view).

Could you tell us what is considered real by Gerard 't Hooft?


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