Gordon wrote: >But you have an inconsistent idea in that on the one hand a theory which >say that they are physical object that becoame no physical and then just >comp pure comp.Now although I dont thing it that narrow just like the >old Clock work view, I do think that your theory can be simpler in that >you dont need to call eletron real or not that dont matter.Just has >everything as it is but araise from Comp.It the same theory just dont >have to bother with QM directly?
I don't understand. I am saying that physics is a branch of psychology, (where physics becomes the study of a relative measure on sharable computationnal histories). Now we can compare that physics with empirical physics, if not just to confirm or refute comp. But then we have to bother with QM, isn'it? (Note that I do not extract the measure from comp but I do extract the logic of yes-no experiments, which can be compare with some quantum logics or algebras). Bruno