Saibal Mitra wrote:

>Bruno wrote:
>At 16:25 +0200 11/10/1996, Saibal Mitra wrote:
>>>You can still have realism, but it must be the >>case that at least some
>>>the things we think of as ``real physical objects´´ >>like e.g. electrons
>>>not real.
>>What would that mean? What would be real? >Even in my thesis, electrons
>>are supposed to have some degree of reality like >relative stability
>>as mind pattern in normal machine dreams (1->person plural histories)
>>for example.
>Well, his theory is rather complicated, but he starts from a deterministic
>theory formulated in terms of primordial variables, that do represent ``real
>things´´.  Although I don't think that his ideas are necessarily correct, it
>does give food for thought.


By Bell and Kochen & Specker theorems those primordial variable
should be non local and contextual, or 't Hooft should be clear about
the different (from QM) experimental predictions his theory gives.
Perhaps I miss something.
Of course you know I believe indeterminism is a consequence of
Mechanism, so 't Hooft move seems to me without clear purpose. I mean
even without QM, I expect verifiable non-locality and contextuality,
or Many-"Worlds". 

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