Saibal Mitra wrote: >Bruno wrote: > >At 16:25 +0200 11/10/1996, Saibal Mitra wrote: > >>>You can still have realism, but it must be the >>case that at least some >of >>>the things we think of as ``real physical objects´´ >>like e.g. electrons >are >>>not real. > > >>What would that mean? What would be real? >Even in my thesis, electrons >>are supposed to have some degree of reality like >relative stability >>as mind pattern in normal machine dreams (1->person plural histories) >>for example. > >Well, his theory is rather complicated, but he starts from a deterministic >theory formulated in terms of primordial variables, that do represent ``real >things´´. Although I don't think that his ideas are necessarily correct, it >does give food for thought.
<snip> By Bell and Kochen & Specker theorems those primordial variable should be non local and contextual, or 't Hooft should be clear about the different (from QM) experimental predictions his theory gives. Perhaps I miss something. Of course you know I believe indeterminism is a consequence of Mechanism, so 't Hooft move seems to me without clear purpose. I mean even without QM, I expect verifiable non-locality and contextuality, or Many-"Worlds".