> See my web page for links to papers, and archive addresses with
> more explanations, including the basic results of my thesis.
> (Mainly the Universal Dovetailer Argument UDA and its Arithmetical
> version AUDA).

I read your argument for the UDA, and there's nothing there that
particularly worries me.  You seem to be making points about the limitations
of the folk-psychology notion of identity, rather than about the actual
nature of the universe...

> >When you say "sum over all computational histories", what if we
> just fix a
> >bound N, and then say "sum over all computational histories of
> algorithmic
> >info. content <= N."  Finite-information-content-universe, no Godel
> >problems.  So what's the issue?
> The main reason is that, once we postulate that we are turing emulable,
> (i.e. the computationalist hypothesis comp), then there is a form
> of indeterminacy which occurs and which force us to take into account the
> incompleteness phenomenon.


I'm sorry, but I don't get it.  Could you please elaborate?


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