Dear Stephen,


    I am not asking that we "postulate materialism", I am trying to reason
through an idea that seems to require the existence of "physicality" at
least in the sense of allowing for the notions of durations and the related
notion of "persistence in time". I am using as a foundation the work of
Peter Wegner ( the notion of "interactive computation") and Vaughan Pratt
(Chu space).

Do you mean an idea that "seems to require the existence of physicality" or
an idea" that require the *seemingly* existence of physicality?
Perhaps the second one after all. Because you add "at least in the sense of
allowing for the notion of duration and persistence in time.
It is true that the UDA makes it possible to imagine a little bit
the "block-mindscape" like the Mandelbrot set makes it possible to "see"
a set recursively inseparable from its complement. But things gets more
interesting when you consider "internal" point of views.
Everett axiom is the monistic and rather simple idea that physician obeys
the physical laws, and that ultimately "the interpretation of physical theories"
should be derivable by some interview of the physician as obeying the physical
laws, and as described by physics.
I, monistically too, embed the mathematician into mathematics and comp is not
so much more than accepting mathematicians obeys mathematical laws.
From Boole to Godel, Lob, Solovay, etc., this idea has been, more or less
consciously pursue, so that I get the tools for making an embryo of interview of
a typical consistent universal lobian machine, or just a self-referentially
correct machine having sufficiently introspective power (being capable to
prove their own \Sigma_1 completeness, technically).
Interviewing the lobian machine is in the Everett spirit, and is possible
for machines thanks to Godel and computer science.
The UDA suggests our physical neighborhoods arise from some means on our
consistent computational extensions. Interviewing the Loebian machine about
those consistent extensions, and about what is invariant through those
extensions does give rise to both anti-symmetrical duration and a quasi-
symmetrical persistence of time, like in most traditional quantum logic
(but unlike the J.L. Bell Quantum one (Bell J.L. 86).

 It is easy to prove NOT-COMP from the dualist assumption.

    To start this discussion could you sketch this "easy" proof that Dualist
assumption -> NOT-COMP? We need to carefully define what COMP and NOT-COMP
are and the nature of the "dualist assuption". I request that you re-read
Pratt's paper titled: "Rational Mechanics and Natural Mathematics "
( which encapsulates my ideas
about the dualist assumption and Peter Wegner's "Mathematical Models of
Interactive Computing" (
which discusses the essential ideas that I see in COMP and NOT-COMP.

COMP is PI + TC + RA (see the preceding posts). The "+" is an "and".

So NOT-COMP is not PI or not TC or not RA.

Apparently you don't like RA. This can be worked out through ultrafinitism,
the idea that big numbers, like 10^100, does not exist.
This is quite "off topic" in a *everything* list, no?

The easy proof that the dualist assumption entails not-comp, comes from the
fact that the UDA proves comp -> immaterial monism. (except if you add
epiphenomemal matter, but then I will add epiphenomenal horses in front of
each cars, to explain how cars move :-)
Note the use of the tautology (p->q) <-> (-q -> -p).

About rereading Pratt's paper, please wait I finish my paper. I'm too busy
and it would not be good to excite my mind on the frontier of what I can say now,
before I finish the paper.

About clarifying the dualist assumption, that's your work. It's your

Best Regards,


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