In lieu of a long response let me point out what I believe is the crux
of our "disagreement":
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Tim May" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "David Woolsey"
Sent: Friday, January 17, 2003 9:51 AM
Subject: Re: I am not meant for your religion
> >We can dismiss the Heisenberg cut without to many problems but we cannot
> >hand wave the categorical distinction between subject and object
> Yes we can! There are a lot of so-called materialist monist. I just show
> that comp leads to immaterialist monism. A good thing given that nobody
> ever been able to just define what could be a material thing. Physicists
> not even try.
These "nobodies" and "physicists" that do not attempt to define what is
a "material thing" are typically material monist; they assume without
question material things and weave endless clever arguments about how qualia
and subjective experience are mere epiphenomenona or "intentional stances".
Your "showing" that comp leads to immaterial monism has the same problem but
instead of mind being an "intentional stance" it is physicality or
materiality that is epiphenomenalism. This is what I have been trying to
explain and yet you keep dodging my pointed thrusts like a skilled fencer.
We are back to were we started a long time ago. Could you consider, even
for the sake of discussion, a dualism what in the limit of "Everything"
becomes a "neutral monism", similar to Russell's? You read Pratt's paper;
did you not see the explanation of the solution to Descartes' dilemma? The
epiphenomenalism problem simply goes away!