> From: Mirai Shounen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> I think your idea makes sense.
> Just like the distance between two particles is not 'nothing'
> but a real
> property of the universe at that time (therefore there are 3 things
> mary's brain), also the specific configuration of
> neurotransmitters and
> electrical impulses in the brain is something not less real than the
> individual constituent parts of the brain itself. So it could
> very well be
> that we are this something (this configuration). Maybe there
> is something it
> feels like for the distance between two particles to increase.
> Another possibility is that subjective sensations and qualia
> are the only
> things that exist, the very structure of the universe, and
> the existence of
> the physical, and even the way it seems to all make sense,
> these maybe only
> details of the experiences that we happen to have.
> I imagine an infinite dimensional space in which every
> possible quale has
> one dimension, with intensity ranging from 0 to infinity.
> Within such a
> framework, every stream of consciousness could be defined as a
> multidimensional curve. At Point A you have pain in your neck
> of intensity
> X, see a red blob with intensity Y and so forth. Then your
> point at that
> time would be (x,y) in a 2dimensional space (for simplicity).
> This solves
> copy paradoxes and teleportation arguments, if it's not clear
> how it does so
> feel free to mail me.
> I have an additional thought about qualia that I haven't found in
> literature.
> For us to talk about qualia the brain needs to represent
> them. If the brain
> represents them, then they are not qualia anymore. When we
> say the redness
> of red, the brain is representing this, so in the end it IS
> all a matter of
> data structures and representation. This in my opinion invalidates
> dualistic theories, since it eliminates the need for any kind
> of soul and
> for a connection between soul and hardware. Any thoughts on this?
> mirai++

Re the latter thought:
Can I suggest reading a pile of Daniel Dennett? The
'representationalist' or its extremum: the "eliminativist" end of
consciousness is, as are all other philosophical positions as far as I
can tell,  both right and wrong. (The exception: the projectivist,
this seems to match the model). I have said elsewhere: "If
representation is all these is to consciousness then a mediocre poet
could make paper hurt". Yes there is representation. However, the
representation is in matter, literally. Not just a bunch matter
pointing at a thing, but the thing.

Re the former thought:
I am at the end of a very long formulation of a theory and it is
sourced entirely through the multi-disciplinary study of brain matter
over 2 years of 'lockup'. I already know where and how and why the
effects I describe are carried out with anatomical clues in neurons
and glia (astrocytes). That side of it is all in the bag. I don't need
a solution to that end of the detail to qualia. Job's done.

It's the fundamental nature of the _visibility_ of the phenomena used
to generate  that is what my question is all about.


An observation:
1) There is a spectacular lack of posts with links to papers and other
supporting material.
2) Nobody has come out with a silver bullet to refute it to death.

I conclude that I am out on a novel but breezy little speculative
ismuth at the frontier of knowledge. I'm starting to get used to that.
:-) It seems to be the lot of the guy holding this kind of proposal.
It's a dirty job but....

Oh well, I tried.


Colin Hales

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