Re the latter thought: Can I suggest reading a pile of Daniel Dennett? The 'representationalist' or its extremum: the "eliminativist" end of consciousness is, as are all other philosophical positions as far as I can tell, both right and wrong.
Hmm.. I've read a few piles of Dennett myself, so I wonder what your take is on the essays "Instead of Qualia" and "Quining Qualia".. I believe Dennett makes a good case that before you seek confirmation for your favorite theory behind "qualia", you first ought to argue that the very idea of "qualia" is something worth taking seriously.
Also.. you say that there are 3 things in 2C Mary's brain..the two points and their distance..well, why not every subdivision of that distance too? Or every set of subdivisions?
>What argument removes that third 'thing' from Mary as an (cognitive) entity occupying our universe? I find I can no longer dismiss this third thing.
I have an argument: no 'things' in this sense can be cited as playing any informative, explanatory roles in Mary's behavior. In any case one ought to have arguments >for< including entities in theories, not against.
(..sorry to occupy everything-list with this, but I'd be interested in continuing somewhere else. One day I'd like to have the time to discuss how consciousness relates to the computationalist TOE views presented here (especially Bruno's and Juergen's) though..)