On 25 April 2004 Kory Heath wrote:

Not yet. We know that the bizarre, inconsistent worlds must exist if the Platonia idea is correct, but we (or at least I) don't currently know how likely they are. In Platonia, there are X number of possible-next-states from my current state. (For simplicity's sake, lets even say that X is a very very large finite number.) If a vast majority of these states show me sitting in my chair typing, with my computer not turning into a kangaroo, etc., then no, the fact that my world so far has not been bizarre and inconsistent does *not* cast doubt on the validity of the Platonia theory. In fact, if we can show logically, mathematically, or computationally (for me these are all ultimately the same thing) that a vast majority of my next-possible-states do in fact show me sitting in my chair typing, with very few computers turning into kangaroos, this would be an extremely strong reason to believe that the Platonia theory is correct, because it's survived a rather stringent falsification test.

This analysis is sound only in the common sense single world situation. You get into trouble if you try to use conventional probabilities if multiple histories/worlds/copies are allowed, as I tried to show with the teleportation example.

Suppose that the overwhelming majority of your next-possible-states are totally bizarre, according to the theory we are testing. If only one copy of you can exist at any one time, then the theory predicts that there is a billion to one probability that in the next second you will find yourself in a bizarre universe. As a matter of fact, as you read these words, you do not find that the world around you suddenly becomes bizarre. Therefore, the theory is most likely wrong.

Consider now a similar theory, but multiple copies of you are allowed. The theory predicts that there will be one billion branchings of the world in the next second, with each branch containing a person who shares all your memories up to that point. The theory also predicts, as above, that all but one of these worlds will be obviously bizarre. As a matter of fact, as you read these words, you do not experience the world around you suddenly becoming bizarre. But unlike the previous example, this is entirely consistent with the theory, which predicted that one version of you would continue in the world as per usual.

--Stathis Papaioannou

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