Hal Ruhl wrote:

As to the "Laws of Logic" with respect to information [and I think I said this earlier] the information in a kernel is indeed static. The "laws of Logic" are just our locally grown [and apparently sequential] way of revealing it. The question I raise is the implicit inclusion of time in this process.

I think it would be simpler if you responded directly to quotes from my previous post, rather than just making general statements about issues raised in that post. For example, here you continue to *assert* that there is something inherently time-based about logical statements, but you don't in any way explain what is wrong with my counterargument from that post:

'The laws of logic need not be thought of as rules of "discovery", they can be thought of purely as expressing static relationships between static truths, relationships that would exist regardless of whether anyone contemplated or "discovered" them. For example, in every world where X and Y are simultaneously true, it is also true that X is true, even if no one notices this.'

Likewise, you didn't address my point that "I can't think of any historical examples of new mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you to already believe their premises in order to justify these premises", and you didn't address my question about whether you think there could be a world/kernel where a vehicle simultaneously had different numbers of wheels, or my question about whether, when you make statements about your theory as a whole like "the information re the Nothing is in the All so they are infinitely nested" you are assuming that the negation of these statements (in this case, 'the information re the Nothing is not in the All so they are not infinitely nested') is false.

Should we have the hubris to impose this somewhat questioned concept on all other universes? In my view the states of all universes preexist in the All [as some of the kernels] and "Physical Reality" washes over them in some sequentially inconsistent way.

So do believe the statement "the states of all universes don't preexist in the All, and 'Physical Reality' does not wash over them in any sequentially inconsistent way" would be false? If so, it seems that you yourself have the "hubris" to apply the logical law of noncontradiction to statements about reality as a whole.

I do not agree with your "rather" based cancelation of the residual information issue since I see it as an unnecessary complication of my own method.

I'm not sure what you mean by "rather based cancellation." If you're talking about my point that every statement could be simultaneously true and false if you throw out the laws of logic, obviously *I* don't believe this is a good way to solve the "residual information issue", since I think it's nonsensical to allow logical contradictions. But since you seem to be saying the laws of logic aren't absolute, I was just pointing out that you would have no basis for denying that statements about reality can be simultaneously true and false. If you say that it is an "unnecessary complication" to allow statements about reality as a whole to be both true and false, then you are in effect saying it would be an unnecessary complication to claim that the laws of logic don't apply to reality as a whole!

Can a kernel of information be self inconsistent? From Bruno's last post I think it is possible to impose this idea on the All.

I don't think Bruno's last post was really implying that "everything" would be inconsistent, I thought his point was more that you can't consider things like the collection of all possible sets to itself be a "set".

My current view is that each state of that dynamic has to be completely independent of the current state.

Does that mean you say the statement "each state of the dynamic is completely dependent on the current state" is false?

The way I describe this is to say that the dynamic is inconsistent. It helps this idea if there are kernels that are pairwise inconsistent.

I don't understand what this means--can you give a concrete example of two kernels that are pairwise inconsistent?

I think that is straight forward enough. If there are kernels that are self inconsistent then all the better. Why should they be selected out?

Then why did you earlier say "I am not ready to include a two wheeled tricycle that is simultaneously a one, three, or four wheeled tricycle"?

As to does mathematics contain information, mathematics has the potential to erect boundaries so by my definition it is information.

But doesn't *any* statement you make about reality as a whole, like "each state of that dynamic has to be completely independent of the current state", erect a "boundary" between itself and its negation, in this case "each state of the dynamic is completely dependent on the current state"?


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