Hi Jesse:

At 03:31 AM 12/18/2004, you wrote:

I think it would be simpler if you responded directly to quotes from my previous post, rather than just making general statements about issues raised in that post. For example, here you continue to *assert* that there is something inherently time-based about logical statements, but you don't in any way explain what is wrong with my counterargument from that post:

I was still having reading difficulties with my new lenses so this was easier for me.

'The laws of logic need not be thought of as rules of "discovery", they can be thought of purely as expressing

"Expressing" seems to be a time dependent process.

static relationships between static truths, relationships that would exist regardless of whether anyone contemplated or "discovered" them.

As are my kernels of information.

For example, in every world where X and Y are simultaneously true, it is also true that X is true, even if no one notices this.'

Sure, That is a kernel. Observation does not make a kernel a kernel.

Likewise, you didn't address my point that "I can't think of any historical examples of new mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you to already believe their premises in order to justify these premises",

I believe Bruno said that some information systems included a set of beliefs. As I recall the "premises" are these beliefs. Justification comes from emotions [based on other beliefs] surrounding the resulting system such as simplicity, elegance of apparent explanation etc. So it seems to me that justification is part of belief.

and you didn't address my question about whether you think there could be a world/kernel where a vehicle simultaneously

Again time inserts itself as the notion of "simultaneously".

had different numbers of wheels,

If the world was a CA and half the applicable cells were in a two wheel state and half in a three wheel state what would that be?

What would be the concept of number in such a place?

or my question about whether, when you make statements about your theory as a whole like "the information re the Nothing is in the All so they are infinitely nested" you are assuming that the negation of these statements (in this case, 'the information re the Nothing is not in the All so they are not infinitely nested') is false.

See below

Should we have the hubris to impose this somewhat questioned concept on all other universes? In my view the states of all universes preexist in the All [as some of the kernels] and "Physical Reality" washes over them in some sequentially inconsistent way.

So do believe the statement "the states of all universes don't preexist in the All, and 'Physical Reality' does not wash over them in any sequentially inconsistent way" would be false? If so, it seems that you yourself have the "hubris" to apply the logical law of noncontradiction to statements about reality as a whole.

I am just try to think of the simplest system that contains no information and yet has a dynamic that could support what might be the universe some may believe they inhabit.

But then is there really a process like "think"?

The All as I defined it [my current proposed belief] contains a kernel for the Nothing as well as a kernel for the All thus the nesting.

From the inside perspective we are forced to be in, all we have to justify such a belief system is our own beliefs re efficiency, beauty, etc. etc. so our beliefs justify our beliefs. Is this not self referential? I do not intend to impose that on the system as a whole.

I do not agree with your "rather" based cancelation of the residual information issue since I see it as an unnecessary complication of my own method.

I'm not sure what you mean by "rather based cancellation." If you're talking about my point that every statement could be simultaneously true and false if you throw out the laws of logic, obviously *I* don't believe this is a good way to solve the "residual information issue", since I think it's nonsensical to allow logical contradictions. But since you seem to be saying the laws of logic aren't absolute, I was just pointing out that you would have no basis for denying that statements about reality can be simultaneously true and false. If you say that it is an "unnecessary complication" to allow statements about reality as a whole to be both true and false, then you are in effect saying it would be an unnecessary complication to claim that the laws of logic don't apply to reality as a whole!

I just believe in my own sense of neatness. You gave two apparently contradictory statements which when put in the same pot seem to sum to what I propose for the whole system absent the "rather". I wish to avoid including our "laws of logic" as a necessary component of a kernel.

Further a kernel contains information but the whole system does not so how does logic apply to the whole system in the first place.

Can a kernel of information be self inconsistent? From Bruno's last post I think it is possible to impose this idea on the All.

I don't think Bruno's last post was really implying that "everything" would be inconsistent, I thought his point was more that you can't consider things like the collection of all possible sets to itself be a "set".

My current view is that each state of that dynamic has to be completely independent of the current state.

My point is that it is more pleasing to think of the dynamic as being inconsistent [each state has no cause effect link of any sort to any other state] if there are other components of the All that are inconsistent. But these are not really the same thing and I begin to think the latter is a side bar issue.

Does that mean you say the statement "each state of the dynamic is completely dependent on the current state" is false?

I believe we should avoid applying logic to a zero internal information entity such as the All. I believe this causes problems.

The way I describe this is to say that the dynamic is inconsistent. It helps this idea if there are kernels that are pairwise inconsistent.

I don't understand what this means--can you give a concrete example of two kernels that are pairwise inconsistent?

Give this a try: One in which "planets" are naturally solid spheres and one in which "planets" are naturally Dyson spheres.

I think that is straight forward enough. If there are kernels that are self inconsistent then all the better. Why should they be selected out?

Then why did you earlier say "I am not ready to include a two wheeled tricycle that is simultaneously a one, three, or four wheeled tricycle"?

I opened this thread to test my beliefs. This one seems to be in flux.

As to does mathematics contain information, mathematics has the potential to erect boundaries so by my definition it is information.

But doesn't *any* statement you make about reality as a whole, like "each state of that dynamic has to be completely independent of the current state", erect a "boundary" between itself and its negation, in this case "each state of the dynamic is completely dependent on the current state"?

I distinguish between actual boundaries and the potential to erect one. The All is full of boundaries between kernels but has no potential to erect more. In your "dependent" case one has to manage the dependency rules - a necessary potential to erect boundaries.


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