At 09:41 27/01/05 +0000, Brent Meeker wrote:

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2005 2:32 PM
>Subject: Re: Belief Statements

>With comp the
>mind-body relation is one-one
>in the body -> mind  direction, and one-many in the mind-body direction. It
>is counter-intuitive but no less than QM without collapse (Everett, Deutch).

This seems doubtful to me.  A mind (all minds we know of) think of themselves
as associated with a body and they are so associated.  As I understand your
"comp hypothesis" it is that a mind-body can fork into two or more mind-body
pairs - but it's no longer the same mind; so the relation is still one-to-one.

Brent Meeker

Only after the forking. Before it is, from a measure point of view, as if you were
simultaneously in two equivalent computations (without this no interference-like
phenomena would ever be possible). Remember the Y = II law. A forking leads
two a multiplication of the computational history.


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