At 09:41 27/01/05 +0000, Brent Meeker wrote:
>-----Original Message----- >From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2005 2:32 PM >To: email@example.com >Subject: Re: Belief Statements
>With comp the >mind-body relation is one-one >in the body -> mind direction, and one-many in the mind-body direction. It >is counter-intuitive but no less than QM without collapse (Everett, Deutch). > >Bruno
This seems doubtful to me. A mind (all minds we know of) think of themselves as associated with a body and they are so associated. As I understand your "comp hypothesis" it is that a mind-body can fork into two or more mind-body pairs - but it's no longer the same mind; so the relation is still one-to-one.
Only after the forking. Before it is, from a measure point of view, as if you were
simultaneously in two equivalent computations (without this no interference-like
phenomena would ever be possible). Remember the Y = II law. A forking leads
two a multiplication of the computational history.