Hal Finney writes:
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single universe
> that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider the
> thought-experiment I suggested in my post at
> http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html --
Generally, I don't think the same logic applies to copying a mind in a single universe than to splitting of worlds in the MWI. Copying a mind will double its measure, while splitting one leaves it alone. That is a significant practical and philosophical difference.
Practically, copying a mind leaves it with half as many resources per new-mind, while splitting it leaves it with the same number of resources per mind. This means that you might take very different practical actions if you knew that your mind was going to be copied than if you were about to split a coin.
Philosophically, the measure of the observer-moments associated with a copied mind are twice as great as the measure of the observer-moments associated with a split one. Obviously 2 is not equal to 1. This puts the burden of proof on those who would claim that this difference is philosophically irrelevant in considering issues of consciousness.
Are you suggesting that the "splitting" in the MWI is different to duplication? The only difference I can see between duplicating a person via a Star Trek teleporter and the MWI splitting is that in the latter case, the whole universe is duplicated. If you could put the whole universe into God's teleporter, wouldn't that be the same as the MWI splitting?
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