I would like to gather everyone's attention to point to
an essential conceptual error that exists in the current 
debating points of this topic, which in fact has been
an egregious error in logic for the past 2500 years,
ever since Plato.

Recent postings cite:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Jonathan Colvin wrote:
> [quoting Stathis]
> > >My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the
> > >duplicated system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I
> > >"became one" with the new system by direct neural interface. I
> > >don't have to go to such lengths to learn about the new
> > >system's mass, volume, behaviour, or any other property, and
> > >in *this* consists the essential difference between 1st person
> > >and 3rd person experience. You can minimise it and say it
> > >doesn't really make much practical difference, but I don't
> > >think you can deny it.
> >
> >I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the difference
> >between A): *a description of an apple*; and B): *an apple*. I don't think
> >anyone would deny that there is a difference between A and B (even with
> >comp
> >there is still a difference); but this "essential difference" does not seem
> >to have anything in particular to do with qualia or experience.
> >
> >Jonathan Colvin
> Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever meaningfully include
> what it is like to be that thing?
> --Stathis Papaioannou

In 1996 at "Towards a Science of Consciousness" (Tucson) I presented
several exhibits, each one highlighting some specific relational qualia
of existence in isolation, and identifying each/all in reagrd to a
potential single holistic description of being -and- performances of

The one that has bearing here, was simply an apple - inside a black box
which no light could enter, until the box was opened and photons could
reach the surface of the apple.

The discussion point went something like this:  In contradistinction to 
the 2500 years old 'definition' of self and completeness set forth by
Plato in his discussions of 'real' vis a vis 'ideal', notice is heregiven
that the apple inside the closed box is - ideally - an entity which 
is without color ... absolutely and always - even though weak-logic
presumes and assigns color 'to' things and entities, de facto.

The full existential extent and outer-bound limit of the apple goes
-only- up to BUT NOT BEYOND its physical manifestation; in this case
in entity: its skin.  Where skin -ends-, "apple" .. -ends- and does 
not 'exist'.


'color' - that which we first-order associate -with- apple, exists -solely-
in that region -outside and beyond- ... where 'apple' does not exist.  By
sheer rigid definition of 'existence' - and logical definitions re 'sets' -
apple and 'color' are and always must be -mutually exclusive-, with no Venn
intersection at all. 


1. No entity is 'complete' in and of itself; entities are "completed" only 
in co-presence of external environmentals.

2. Systems and entities -will have- qualia that exist (emergently) from
I-Thou relations which they may not be internally aware of, or be self 
appreciative of, nor the impacts of these qualia on their 'self'.

First and Third frames of reference can never be identical, and   

'exhibition of qualia' versus 'access to qualia for feedback purposes'
are quite different things.

Cybernetic secondary connections 'smooth' and blur this relationship
of being.

(there is more, but I don't have time at the moment to continue; sorry
to do a 'fermat', but I'll write again, if anyone cares to explore this
thread after this posting today)

Jamie Rose
19 May 2005

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