> > I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes
> > because your brain is a part of an obviously successful
> > survival machine designed by evolution.
> Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where
> reality is made up of nothing but observer-moments at the most fundamental
> level--something like the "naturalistic panpsychism" discussed on that
> webpage I mentioned.
The disagreement I have with what you have written
is that I do *not* see observer-moments as the most
fundamental entities. It's just so much *clearer*
to me to see them arising only after 13.7 billion
years or so (locally) and that they obtain *only* as
a result of physical processes.
When in the laboratory we examine the concepts mice
have of the world, we can easily see their limitations.
What would we think of mice who attempted to found all
of reality on "mouse observer moments"? Unfortunately
for the ultimate survival prospects of mice, they're
not capable of understanding evolution and their own
highly contingent appearance in it.
We are, and we should be talking as though we do understand.
> So does this mean you have no problem with idealism per
> se, as long as it does not claim that there is no external reality
> independent of *my* perceptions of it (even if this external reality
> consists of nothing but other observer-moments, with some sort of measure
> attached to each)? Is there anyone on this list who disagrees with the idea
> of such an external reality? If not, then who are your criticisms aimed at?
It all depends on which way you think the explanations gain
the most mileage. You can start with these "human observer
moments"---which are in principle not comparable from one
entity to another and about which anyone's opinion is as
good as anyone else's, or you can start from what we have
learned so far about the universe we're embedded in.