It seems to me (oh no, subjectivity!) that believing in an objective reality is doing the same epistemic move as Bruno's belief in arithmetic realism and Godel's Platonism. Isn't belief in "objective reality" really by definition simply saying that there's something CAUSING ALL of our subjective observations? If there is no objective reality, then it begs the question, "Where do all our subjective observations come FROM?" Surely not from other subjective observations, by definition. If you don't believe in objective reality, then your alternatives are: 1) try to explain repeatability of observations in some weird indirect way and go crazy, or 2) just throw up your hands and be agnostic and give up any motivation for science other than pragmatism, which results in a pretty dismal outcome, the same outcome as the 20th century philosophers: despair.

Tom Caylor

-----Original Message-----
To: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Tue, 9 Aug 2005 08:38:10 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Re: subjective reality

Dear Bruno,

I hope not to affront Lee when I imply that "both of
us" may well accept the 1st person "impression of
reality" as interpreted by the 1st person mind, only
the "objective" encompassing reality - which is not
accesible in its uninterpreted format - is the
problem. Interpreted used as subjectivised.
There is a fine line separating solipsism from
craziness and to 'verify' the existence of an
uninterpreted reality would go beyond our lifetimes -
unless we resort to beliefs of convenience.

John M

--- Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Le 08-août-05, à 17:49, Lee Corbin a écrit :

> (True, we can also extend sympathy by believing it
to be utterly
> true that he is experiencing pain, but I think
that John and I
> (and many) are simply not comfortable with
introducing a "reality",
> namely, "subjective reality" to cover this simple

This amounts to dismissing the first person. I am
sure you did have
known to be living some "subjective reality".
What exactly makes you not comfortable with the
"other mind" reality?
Is it the fact that it is not verifiable?
In that case again, incompleteness theorem can be
used as a cure,
because it makes utterly clear that for the sound
machine there are
many truth which are guess-able but unprovable.

Is it the fact that once you accept the reality of
the first person
experiences, then we are led to that first person
indeterminacy from
which the physical laws emerges, assuming comp
(which you accept)?

You are neither a zombie, nor a solipsist, so what
is the origin of you
dismissing the reality of first person experiences.
I am very curious,
because, as you say, you are not the only one.

Is it because you do feel some inconsistency with
your physicalist
assumptions, once we take seriously the "assumption"
that others can
feel genuine pleasures and pains.

Anyway. We are not supposed to search comfort, but
to reason from facts
and assumptions, isn't it?


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