Hi Lee ,


It was just a figure of speech.  You are free, of course, to use
the word "reality" any way you want.  I'm not comfortable for using
it to describes one's subjective impressions, feelings, etc.


But I am not using the word "reality" to *describe* one's subjective impression, it seems to me I am just acknowledging the existence of those subjective impression in many persons. To acknowledge something is to admit that something has some kind of "reality", it seems to me. And it seems you did acknowledge those experiences too). To describe them, in the limit, I can only point you to great poets and artists, and they will hardly mention the word "reality".

You just seems to want those experiences are just an unnecessary epiphenomenon, and you would like that science never adresses what they really are and where they came from. For you it looks like "consciousness" is just a sort of subjective mirror partially reflecting an objective third person describable reality in which we are embedded. And science should never leave the third person discourse. All right?

Now, please understand that I agree (100%) with the last sentences: science should never leave the third person discourse. But this does not prohibit science of looking to herself, and to try theories (hypotheses) about third person discourses, and even to *discover* sort of first person discourse canonically associated to some mathematical object.

By taking the comp hyp enough seriously it just happens that "consciousness", or just the "ability to guess the existence of one (at least) world" is not a little detail. Or it is a little detail but then remember that the devil is hidden in the little details. Why? Because if I am correct in my derivation it makes the physical law emerging from number theory.


So you say.  And I confess I haven't the energy (and probably not
the preparation) to study your thesis. So I'll wait for the experts
to acclaim you.  No one will cheer louder:  "I knew him *before*
the world saw the truth to COMP!  He even knows who I am!".


My heart appreciates very much. My poor brain, or some reasoner who appears to succeed to manifest himself through it, relatively to you, is a little bit astonished: you are amazingly honest and confess you could give a weight to authoritative argument. Ah la la. I think it would be better to get the understanding by yourself, then you could say " I thought it", but perhaps you do get some understanding, I think :-) Actually my work is "the work" which people should understand by themselves, if only to understand the second part where they must understand that machine can understand it by themselves, in some precise sense. You could also be disappointed. Although the conclusion is startling, technically my contribution is modest and leads quickly to soluble but intractable questions. A paper entitled "Theoretical Computer Science and the Natural Sciences" should appear soon, though.


My friends and I (and probably Daniel Dennett and so on) believe
that people who demand a 1st person "account of the world" (e.g.
Chalmers) will never get anywhere.



Actually, this is one of the main point where I differ from George Levy (OK George?), although I could make sense of it. The point is, and Dennett agrees on this, that, in cognitive *science*, we need to develop some third person discourse on the first person discourses. OK, strictly speaking the quantum and physical discourses appears at some first person (plural) level.

Chalmers is not getting anywhere(*), ok. Perhaps we agree on this.

(*) Using Everett to defend dualism! See the quite good explanation how Everett is deeply monist in the book: PRIMAS H., 1981, Chemistry, Quantum Mechanics and Reductionism, Springer-Verlag, Berlin (second, corrected edition : 1983)


That the "hard problem" or
whatever is just a horrible consequence of the way sense impressions
traveling on neurons give rise to people thinking that their
own perceptions are a sort of reality independent of the physical
reality.  We think that this is a sort of delusion, although the
very #?!&[EMAIL PROTECTED] structure of our language hideously leads from that
to "who or what is being deluded?".


Mmhh....



This might be a good time to ask what is meant by that word you
just used.  Hal explained "computationalist hypothesis" as used
by philosophers, e.g., that a robot (that was just CPU driven)
could be conscious.


Actually this is the strong AI thesis. Logically comp is stronger, because comp is the thesis that "I" am a machine (I, You, ...). Comp is stronger because the fact that machine could think does not entails that only machine could think! (despite Occam!). Now comp is weaker than most functionalism in the philosophy of mind, because comp asserts only the existence of a level of substitution at which we are Turing-emulable. Functionalist reason like if the level was known, but that's impossible.


 have believed that since 1966 when I used
to argue about it with people in high school. *Lots* of people
believe that.  I have taken "COMP" to be Bruno's Thesis, in which
practically everything can be derived fundamentally from the
integers alone, using Gödel's results, and other rather recently
discovered truths.


No no. That's the theorem. Comp is precisely the conjonction of Church Thesis, of some amount of belief in arithmetic, + the act of faith saying "yes" to *some* digitalist surgeon.
All what I say, I derive it (hopefully correctly) from comp.

It is also different from Schmidhuber (and many others) who makes the thesis that there is a "physical universe" and that it is computable (programmable). I think that comp is quasi-incompatible with this.



So I dismiss the 1st person, remarking that it's "existence" is
but only to be expected. If an ape or a parrot could talk, it
could yak on about it's impressions. And they'd be of little
but therapeutic value.

Thanks for acknowledging the therapy! With comp, this would mean the appearance of the physical world originates in some intrinsic universal machine self-therapy. It makes sense when you realize that Lob formula (B(Bp->p)->Bp), the main axiom of the modal logic of self-reference (G) can be interpreted as showing that some form of honest placebo effect works! But this is something I am still taking with some grain of salt. See the book "Forever Undecided" to see Smullyan exploiting the working of some self-fulfilling beliefs.



As anything scientific, yes. I agreed with John's statement:
"Interpreted used as subjectivised. There is a fine line separating
solipsism from craziness..."  at least insofar as I may read that
to mean that our subjective impressions actually turn out to be
less reliable than our efforts to understand things objectively
(3rd person).


But I agree too! This does not prevent us the study of first person discourse, by use of all the possible scientific way to tackle problems.

I must go now. Apology for not having respected the order of your paragraphs, but my computer take some initiative apparently!

Best regards,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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