On 31 Aug 2005, at 16:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

I think most people would grant you that the mind-body problem has not been solved.

Not meet them so much in my experience. Positive Religious (like Muslim, Catholic, ...) have build-in solution. It is most of the time tabu to question them. Negative Religious (like Atheist) have build- in solution, but are generally not aware of the religiosity of their solutions. Only (serious) philosopher of mind/cognitive scientists are aware of the problem.

They would probably would also agree
that 3 classes of solutions (at least) have been presented over the centuries, namely, (1) Physicalist solutions (there is no mind stuff!) (2) Pure Idealist solutions (there is no body- stuff=matter) and (3) Dualist varieties where both exist and you try to figure out how the two stuffs interact etc... It seems to me that your attempted solution is of type (2), Am I right?

Well OK. I guess you make the difference between solipsism and idealism which can be realist or platonist. The mind stuff is just numbers and their dreams ...

You do however
invoke a favorite classical physicalist hypothesis in the form of YD and than you "turn the tables" on it, so to speak, no?

YD has nothing with classical physicalism, unless you assume physicalism at the start. YD does not assume a universe physically exist, only that "I" exists and that I am supported by a relatively stable (sheaf) of computations. Actually the use of the YD in the UD reasoning is accompanied by an explicit postulation of a physical universe for making the reasoning easier, but that hypothesis is explicitly eliminated toward the end of the reasoning.

I think that the YD motivation is the weakest link in your chain (a real Trojan horse because it is physically untenable)

I really don't understand. To make YD false you must associate yourself to something non-turing emulable. Nobody has ever found a non, turing emulable process. Recall that quantum-like indeterminacy can be retrieved in the self-discourse of self-duplicating machine. Also, with some notable exception like Penrose, everybody accept YD. I teach about it since more than 30 years, and only strict dualists (with assumes explicit substancial soul) criticize it. I told you that those who get my point (of the UD Argument) and still soes not accept the conclusion prefer to abandon Arithmetical Realism. It is an empirical discovery in the sense that (I think we agree here), it is almost nonsense for me to abandon arithmetical realism.

to so
 if you use just to demolish it later, why use it at all?

This is the eleventh time you confuse "p -> q" with "q -> p". Unless (here) you mean by "demolish YD", the non use of YD in the translation of UDA in arithmetic.

Why not proceed to that interview directly?

You can. But this is like going from physics to the study of differential equation. Here it would consist to go from cognitive science to pure mathematics. Actually if you justify that probability *must* obey to the Bp -> Dp rule (probability one of p entails the probability of ~p is not one), then OK, you can extract the comp- physics from math alone. But how will you explain the Bp -> Dp rule in that context? Why suppress a motivation which also makes the link with theology: the fact that the comp-doctor cannot pretend that "science" has show that you can survive with an artificial brain (in case comp is true).

Can that be done and leave your argument intact? That would make it a lot more interesting in my opinion...

You are in minority here, but this is just because most people agree with YD (or at least it makes sense as an hypothesis in the cognitive science).



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