On 06 Sep 2005, at 02:27, Lee Corbin wrote:

Bruno writes

Well, even at step 0 (Yes doctor), if the doctor is honest it will
warn you that the artificial brain is a digital device, and I cannot
imagine him explaining what that really means in all generality
without invoking Church thesis.

That's funny.  My doctor never explains even how my blood pressure
medication works. On the contrary, the surgeons would definitely
*not* bring up CT when/if they replace a bundle of neurons with an
electronic cable; their only assurances to the patient are whether
works or not, and whether I'll feed any pain (besides the bill).

Nor, does it seem, does Microsoft or Intel ever use CT in its
promotions of various devices for, say, the military. Everyone
already knows what computers do (roughly), and what can be
expected of them.

OK, but in the case an artificial brain is proposed the doctor should explain to his patient that his survival is hypothetical. If not there will be problems. Well, brain graft surgery is already done and usually the doctor gives more explanation that those who fixe cars or any "non directly first person related" object. I think that in the USA some hospital or universities give some training to the medicine student so they can remember that their patient are not just third person manipulable bodies, but also Person. (First) Person.

The accepted *definition* by usage that everyone uses is that it
is a *claim* that classical (non-QM) robots could be conscious,
that minds could be uploaded into computers. So invent your own
term if you don't like how the rest of the world is using
of "computationalism".

I am very glad with the way the rest of the world (but for some rare exception I can count with one hand) use the term computationalism, and I use it in the same way abstracted from the result I got which shows their contradictions related to their wanting computationalism married with materialism.

Comp is really for Computationalism in a weaker sense than most computationalist use the term, and then I give a proof (deductive argument) that if we take comp seriously enough, keeping in mind the 1-3 distinctions, physics can no more stay "fundamental". Physical histories and their physical invariant emerges "logico- arithmetically" from some computer science mathematical structures.

I explain all this in a sufficiently precise way as to be refuted. Currently facts are going in the sense that QM confirms comp.

I think, Lee, from our last conversation, that you do have understand the first person comp indeterminacy. Could we move on to UDA step 4 ?
Cf: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf


PS Sorry for being slower but I got exams with students and other typical non-holiday stuffs.


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