Correction, I seem to have misunderstood Statis' set up. If you really
create a new world and then create and kill the person there then the
probability of survival is 1. This is different from quantum mechanical
To see this, consider first what would have happened had the person not been
killed. Then his measure would have doubled. But because he is killed in one
of the two copies of Earth, his measure stays the same. In a quantum suicide
experiment his measure would be reduced by a factor two.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 02:25 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all that
> exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the past,
> alternative histories, etc. they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't
> see how some states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the
> universe we experience seems to be real to us while alternative universes,
> or past or future states of this universe are not being experienced by us.
> So, you must think of yourself at any time as being randomly sampled from
> the set of all possible observer moments. To get to answer b) you have to
> redefine your identity so that experiencing having done the experiment
> becomes a necessary part of your identity. But this is cheating because
> wouldn't say that if ''death'' were replaced by a partial memory erasure
> such that the experience of having done the experiment were wiped out form
> your memory.
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: <email@example.com>
> Sent: Saturday, November 26, 2005 11:51 AM
> Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
> > Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> > If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I am
> > instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are
> > several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person
> > viewpoint:
> > (a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5
> > (b) Pr(I live) = 1, Pr(I die) = 0
> > (c) Pr(I live) = 0, Pr(I die) = 1
> > Even on this list, there are people who might say (a) above is the case
> > rather than (b) or (c).
> > Bruno Marchal replies:
> > Are you sure?
> > I was thinking of people who accept some ensemble theory such as MWI,
> > don't believe in QTI. I must admit, I find it difficult to understand
> > even a dualist might justify (a) as being correct. Would anyone care to
> > help?
> > Stathis
> > _________________________________________________________________
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