Jesse Mazer wrote:

Also, I'm still confused about your original argument:

"Since you agree that the number of histories is on a continuum, you must accept that no matter how large or small a segment of the continuum is considered, the number of histories is the same. Hence measure is the same for any observer."

What is the "number of histories" that is the same here? Weren't you saying the number is infinity? And do you agree that in general it is not correct to say that because two sets contain an infinite number of elements, that means their measure must be the same?

I am only talking about the cardinality of the continuum as applied to the number of histories and its implication regarding measure: Since the number of histories included in the past of an observer - and consistent with his present - has the same infinity as the continuum, then this cardinality is the same for any observer. To ask an observer about his own measure (when he is alive of course) is meaningless.

As an example consider the following hypothetical situation: suppose that one of the greatest scientist such as Isaac Newton had never been born. Classical Mechanics would still have been invented, but years later, maybe centuries later and the course of our civilazation would have been different. Surely his birth was an unlikely event. Does it mean that our civilizaton has a low measure compared to retarded civilization where he was never born? It sure does not "feel" like it - from a first person point of view.

The only way to talk meaningfully about measure is when you can compare two situations from a third person point of view: for example, if you witness someone die from a freak event you could conclude that he continued living in a world with lower measure than yours. This is a third person point of view. However, from that person's point of view (first person), the freak event never happened and therefore he will consider his measure to be just as high as yours.


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