Quentin Anciaux writes:
> unless you are willing to say that white rabbit universes have a
> lower absolute measure than stable-laws-of-nature universes, you have no
> justification for expecting that you are unlikely to experience such
> in your future.
You have no justification, but in (everything like) multiverse, it is for
(probability 1) that an extension of your present self *will* experience
weird events. Because all possibilities are fullfiled in the multiverse...
The problem arise because of what we call "I"... the "I" that will
weird thing will remember being the present "I"... So when you say that you
have to explain why *you* are unlikely to experience weird event, who is
"you" ? All next "you" will remember being current "you".
This is true, but you can only experience being one person at a time. When I
contemplate what may happen to me tomorrow, I have to consider all the
future versions of me in the multiverse as having equal right to consider
themselves "me". So if half the versions of me tomorrow are expected to
suffer, I am worried, because I might be one of those who suffers. But when
tomorrow comes and I am not suffering, I am relieved - even though those who
are suffering have as much right to consider themselves the continuation of
yesterday's version of "me" as I do. Our psychology creates an asymmetry
between the present and the future when it comes to personal identity. Some
on this list (eg. Lee Corbin) have argued that this is irrational: copies
that are "me" in the future should also be considered "me" in the present
and past. However, our psychological makeup is as it is: our future
encompasses many possibilities, but our present and past is fixed and
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