Le 15-févr.-06, à 17:30, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
As Bruno said, now we really don't know what a machine is.
Actually I was just saying that no machine can *fully* grasp *all aspect* of machine. But machines can know what machines are. Only, if a machine M1 is more complex than M2, M2 will not been able to prove the consistency of M1, for example. And then if we are machine (comp) such limitations apply to us, and this provides lot of informations, including negative one which we can not prove except that we can derive them from the initial comp act of faith ("yes doctor").
Bruno: ... and note that the coherence of taking simultaneously both a and b above is provided by the incompleteness results (Godel, ...) which can be summarized by "... no machine can grasp all aspect of machine".
So in the absense of a precise definition, perhaps we end up running away from ill-defined words like "machine", "reason", "soul", "faith", etc., for who knows what personal "reasons".
That is why I propose simple definitions. Reasoning = provability = Bp = Beweisbar("p") cf Godel 1931. Soul = first person = provability-and-truth = Bp & p = third Plotinus' hypostase. This can look as an oversimplification but the gap between truth and provability (incarnated in the corona G* minus G) detrivialises (if I can say) all this.
My fault. I will come back on this. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/