Wei and Brent:
considering Wei's Q#1 and 2 the thought occurred to me (being almost a virgin in thinking in mathematical constructs) that this looks as an even harder problem than Chalmers's famous neurological "hard problem". For me, at least. With the Q#3 I would ask "who is I?" Mathematically of course. Otherwise we don't know. That would require a mix of 1st and 3rd person notions which is confusing. Same with Q#4. A dilemma of a subset like: validity of a legal position" is easier, because it is only 3rd person related (except for an inclusion of "my opinion" into it. So I can't wait for a solution to Brent's addition: "how to formulate such meanings in math constructs?" Especially in self reference to the formulator "I". Physical existence (for me) is no more plausible than a mathematical existence: both are figments of the mind upon (maybe poorly perceived) impacts we can use only as interpreted for ourselves. John M --- Wei Dai <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Is there a difference between physical existence and > mathematical existence? > I suggest thinking about this problem from a > different angle. > > Consider a mathematical substructure as a rational > decision maker. It seems > to me that making a decision ideally would consist > of the following steps: > > 1. Identify the mathematical structure that > corresponds to "me" (i.e., my > current observer-moment) > 2. Identify the mathematical structures that contain > me as substructures. > 3. Decide which of those I care about. > 4. For each option I have, and each mathematical > structure (containing me) > that I care about, deduce the consequences on that > structure of me taking > that option. > 5. Find the set of consequences that I prefer > overall, and take the option > that corresponds to it. > > Of course each of these steps may be dauntingly > difficult, maybe even > impossible for natural human beings, but does anyone > disagree that this is > the ideal of rationality that an AI, or perhaps a > computationally augmented > human being, should strive for? > > How would a difference between physical existence > and mathematical > existence, if there is one, affect this ideal of > decision making? It's a > rhetorical question because I don't think that it > would. One possible answer > may be that a rational decision maker in step 3 > would decide to only care > about those structures that have physical existence. > But among the > structures that contain him as substructures, how > would he know which ones > have physical existence, and which one only have > mathematical existence? And > even if he could somehow find out, I don't see any > reason why he must not > care about those structures that only have > mathematical existence. > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
