Le 07-avr.-06, à 17:46, 1Z a écrit :
> To be precise, there is no problem with a very basic, simple notion of
> bare substance being the substrate, the bearer, of phenomenal
> properties as well
> as physical properties.
Are you aware of the mind body problem. Are you aware the problem is
> if you assume comutationalism (as a I undertand it, not as you
> understand it)
> you are already assuming
> the existence of matter, since computers are material. ...
You just tell me that you are the one assuming that computers are
material, so your are begging the question.
> The slide from idealism to solipsis is inevitable.
Pythagoras and Plato already showed counterexamples. If numbers
generate a "video-game" sort of reality, the game could still a priori
be sharable, unless you prove the contrary.
> If the existence of
> is not needed to explain my experiences, the existence of other
> with their own experiences is not neeed to explain my experience
Possible, but not necessary. Other minds appears in comp through the
notion of first person plural, (arising from the duplication of entire
population of individuals) and this leads to a notion of "arithmetical
entanglement". Actually theory like Shmidhuber or Hal Finney UDIST,
could probably justify the existence of genuine other minds, and this
despite they are lacking the 1/3 distinction povs. They suppress
nevertheless successfully the 3 person white rabbits, and this
explains, I guess for them, the negligible probability that someone
behaving like a human is a zombie.
The 1/3 distinction needs a more detailed treatment and the question is
obviously still open. Please follow your intuition if you believe you
could find a contradiction in comp, as I understand it. I mean you
could be right, but until now, you don't really argue in your posts.
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