Le 07-avr.-06, à 17:46, 1Z a écrit :

> To be precise, there is no problem with a very basic, simple notion of
> bare substance being the substrate, the bearer, of phenomenal
> properties as well
> as physical properties.

Are you aware of the mind body problem. Are you aware the problem is 
still open.

> if you assume comutationalism (as a I undertand it, not as you
> understand it)
>  you are already assuming
> the existence of matter, since computers are material. ...

You just tell me that you are the one assuming that computers are 
material, so your are begging the question.

> The slide from idealism to solipsis is inevitable.

Pythagoras and Plato already showed counterexamples. If numbers 
generate a "video-game" sort of reality, the game could still a priori 
be sharable, unless you prove the contrary.

> If the existence of
> matter
> is not needed to explain my experiences, the existence of other
> experiencers
> with their own experiences is not neeed to explain my experience
> either.

Possible, but not necessary. Other minds appears in comp through the 
notion of first person plural, (arising from the duplication of entire 
population of individuals) and this leads to a notion of "arithmetical 
entanglement".  Actually theory like Shmidhuber or Hal Finney UDIST, 
could probably justify the existence of genuine other minds, and this 
despite they are lacking the 1/3 distinction povs. They suppress 
nevertheless successfully the 3 person white rabbits, and this 
explains, I guess for them, the negligible probability that someone 
behaving like a human is a zombie.
The 1/3 distinction needs a more detailed treatment and the question is 
obviously still open. Please follow your intuition if you believe you 
could find a contradiction in comp, as I understand it. I mean you 
could be right, but until now, you don't really argue in your posts.



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