Hi Hal,

Le Mercredi 21 Juin 2006 19:31, Hal Finney a écrit :
> What, after all, do these principles mean?  They say that the
> implementation substrate doesn't matter.  You can implement a person
> using neurons or tinkertoys, it's all the same.  But if there is no way
> in principle to tell whether a system implements a person, then this
> philosophy is meaningless since its basic assumption has no meaning.
> The MWI doesn't change that.

That's exactly the point of Bruno I think... What you've shown is that 
physicalism is not compatible with computationalism. In the UD vision, there 
is no real "instantiation" even the UD itself does not need to be 
instantiated, only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary.


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