Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit :

> It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain
> a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change
> to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes.

How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
First nobody knows what such a "substance" can be defined without 
infinite regress.
Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance 
such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the 
property of its subparts (Aristotle the first). But then, the 
ontological existence of such "substance" does not fit neither the 
experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those 
facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL).

If you want use the ontological existence of "matter" to solve the 
Harry Potter enigma, I can prove to you in all details that the only 
way to do that would consist in positing actual non computable 
infinities in matter. Just ask, or read the already available info on 
the list or in my url.

And then, having that heavy matter to play with, you will still have to 
explain how do you link the first person experience to it (the 
mind/body problem).

> The question is not whether there is a world beyond even
> logical possibility, but why the observed world is so much
> smaller than the Platonias. Matter answers that easily.

That the "observed world" is smaller than platonia is trivial: our 
observation are finite, and platonia is infinite.
Now, you, following (I agree) common sense infer the existence of an 
ontological world, but I don't see any clues from which you can infer 
it is smaller than platonia. Actually many infinities appears at the 
bottom, and it is hard how to interpret them.

1Z (to George Levy):
> Science may have moved close to making the observer
> central epistemically , but it has not room for the idea
> that observers are ontologically fundamental.
> Observers are people, homo sapiens, the product of millions
> of years of evolution. Scientifically speaking.

Human observers are people. With comp, *any* locally or partially 
irreversible machine is up for the job. Still, comp makes that large 
class of number/digital-machines basic for just (re)defining a coherent 
notion of physical reality, which remained to be tested with the facts 
(current test are going in the quantum direction).

1Z (to John M)
> The no-metaphysical-role for observers rule is one that
> maintains the consilience of science.
> http://www.csicop.org/si/9701/quantum-quackery.html

I agree that there is a lot of quantum-quackery, as there is 
godel-quackery. This makes progress in our fundament fields 
psychologically difficult to assess.
Unfortunately, many if not most scientist reaction to those quackeries 
are lacking rigor, and contend themselves to present some facts as 
"scientific" when they are not.
Let me give you an example. After Godel published its 1931 
incompleteness paper, the belgium logician Barzin publishes a detailed 
"refutation" of Godel's proof (like many). If I remember well it is 
Kleene, or Kreisel: I should verify, but the point is that big guy in 
logic will criticize, technically, Barzin's attempt to refute Godel. 
All scientist will believe that matter settled until 20 years later, 
Kleene himself (or Kreisel himself) find an error in his own critics. 
It was just false and Barzin's point appeared to be much subtle and 
harder to refute. For sure, Barzin *was* wrong, but many scientist took 
Kleene (or Kreisel) first reply like an authoritative truth ...

>> JM: The observer seems so fundamental in the views of this
>> list (and in wider circles of contemporaryh thinking)
>> that a more general identification may be in order.
> No, no,nooooooo!!!
> It is far too general already.

I don't think so. Read about the lobian machine ...

> The list needs to be a lot more particualr about the
> difference between ontology and epistemology, between
> "to be" and "to know". Then they would not slide
> from "X cannot be known without an observer" to "X cannot exist without
> an observer".

You make a good point, but I am not sure it is a genuine answer for 
John or me.
I will not insist because it is an easy consequence of the UDA (and I 
recall you saying you don't want to study it because, if I remember 
well,  you are so sure the result is false that you don't need to read 
it, but then you miss the opportunity to either find a real error of 
reasoning in my deduction or to discover that the greek theologian were 
right, and naturalism (nature deification) is wrong).

1Z to Lennart Nilsson
> I am trying to get away from the idea that logic needs to
> be propped up by some external authority. The validity
> of logic comes about from the lack of any basis
> to criticise it that doesn't presuppose it. That's
> epistemology, not metaphysics.

I agree for the part of logic use in elementary mathematical theories. 
Still there has been (and still exist) some critics on some formula. 
The most known case is the case of the third excluded principle (A v 
~A). In my context such a critics is a confusion between first person 
and third person. Could say more when I get to the Arithmetical 
Hypostases ...

1Z to Brent
> The claim I made was "Whatever else you
> do, you'll be using logic. There is no
> standpoint outside of logic. No, not
> even evolutionary theory".

I agree with you, as an arithmetical platonist.


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